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INCLUDING VICTIMS WITHOUT A VOICE:
AMENDING INDIANA’S CHILD WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Ashley and her husband, David, are driving home from the hospital
after Ashley was taken there due to pains in her abdomen. The doctor
conducted a few tests and reassured Ashley that the child growing
inside her was perfectly fine. Ashley knows she is being overly cautious
because this is her first pregnancy, but she has wanted this child for
some time and does not want to take any risks nearly six months into the
pregnancy. The new car smell of their recently purchased silver Tahoe is
not helping her already irritated stomach. As David accelerates through
the last intersection before their home, Ashley, to her horror, catches a
glimpse of a blue sports car that is only feet away from slamming into
her side of the Tahoe.
John is driving home to get some sleep before his long shift the
following morning. He knows he should have left the bar earlier, but it
is not often he gets the opportunity to have a few drinks with his old
high-school friends now that he is working the long hours at his new job.
Driving somewhat faster than usual in his blue Mustang, he approaches
an intersection and races through the usually deserted crossing,
believing that few vehicles will be out this late in the evening. The last
thing John remembers seeing before waking up on the side of the road is
the silver SUV that appeared seemingly out of thin air.
Ashley and her husband are rushed back to the hospital. The
paramedic told the couple they were lucky it was a sports car that
collided with their SUV and not something larger. Both Ashley and
David have few injuries themselves, but the irritation in Ashley’s
stomach is no longer present, ironically troubling her even more than
when the pain was unbearable. The doctor performs a few tests and
debates how to tell the couple, whom he reassured just an hour before
that their child was fine, that their child did not survive the collision.
Later on, John is charged with and convicted of reckless driving and
involuntary manslaughter for the death of the child.1 Ashley and David
initiate a suit for wrongful death for the loss of their child, wishing to use
1
See Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The Indiana Court
of Appeals criticized the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Indiana’s child
wrongful death statute. Id. “Under Bolin’s interpretation of the statute, a person whose
wrongful act results in the death of a viable fetus owes no civil duty to the parents and is
not a tortfeasor, even if that same person is convicted of feticide based on the same facts.”
Id. at 701. See generally Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 2002).
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the money to start a new life in a different town closer to their parents.2
This hypothetical will demonstrate, as this Note progresses that Ashley
and David may or may not have a cause of action for the wrongful death
of their unborn child, depending solely on the state where the tragic car
accident occurred.3
The late nineteenth century marked the introduction of wrongful
death claims in the United States.4 Prior to this time, dependents of an
individual tortiously killed by another had no remedy at law to
compensate them for their loss, even if the individual killed was the sole
provider for the entire household.5 Although early wrongful death
claims compensated survivors for only the lost economic benefits the
tortiously killed individual would have provided but for his or her
untimely death, wrongful death claims eventually evolved into a vehicle
for compensating survivors for their emotional trauma as well.6 As
wrongful death laws expanded to cover non-pecuniary losses, a new
question emerged that has divided the states: can parents, under a

2
The following hypothetical is completely fictional and entirely the creation of the
author.
3
See infra Part II.C (explaining the three major approaches that states use to award
damages for fetal wrongful death: states use the live birth, viability, and pre-viability
approaches to determine if a survivor can bring a cause of action for the death of a fetus).
4
See Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 759 (1877). At common law, a
tortfeasor was not liable to any dependents of an individual he tortiously killed. Id. at
756-57. A cause of action for injuries simply died with the injured individual. Id. at 759.
Yet, the Supreme Court nevertheless followed New York’s lead in holding that the death of
a human being does carry civil liability for the tortfeasor to those individuals dependant on
the negligently killed individual. Id.
5
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 127 (5th ed. 1984). The
main purpose of the early wrongful death statutes was to compensate the survivors for the
lost economic benefits they would have received if the deceased was still alive. Id. A trait
that the early wrongful death statutes share with current wrongful death statutes is that
there are only a limited number of individuals who can seek recovery, typically a husband,
wife, child, or parent. Id. The first wrongful death statute included compensation to a
parent seeking recovery for the death of a child even though the damages would be too
speculative to calculate. Id.
6
See Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1977). A wrongful death suit was
initiated by a woman’s husband after she was killed in a car accident. Id. at 1024. Though
the woman provided little economic support to the family, the court allowed the husband
recovery for the loss of his wife’s love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, moral
support, sexual relations, and physical assistance around the home. Id. at 1026. The court
specifically held that wrongful death could be used to compensate survivors for their
emotional trauma even though it is not a pecuniary loss and is at times very speculative.
Id. at 1025–26. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 127. In line with generally expanding tort
liability, many states allow substantial awards for loss of society and comfort under
wrongful death statutes. Id. Currently, many states have expanded wrongful death claims
to include recovery for loss of consortium, loss of love and affection, and loss of guidance
and advice that the survivor would have received but for the death of the decedent. Id.
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theory of wrongful death, be compensated for the loss of their expectant
child not yet born?7
States are sharply divided on how to approach fetal wrongful death,
due to drastically different ideas concerning the legal and moral identity
of the unborn.8 Though the majority of states have recognized a cause of
action for parents who lose a viable, unborn child though the negligent
actions of a third party, Indiana recently chose to revert from the
viability rule and follow the common law policy of allowing recovery for
prenatal injuries only if a child survives until birth.9 Though compelling
arguments can be advanced for following different approaches to fetal
wrongful death, Indiana has chosen to follow a rule of law that produces
inequitable and incongruous results by denying recovery to parents
whose unborn child is tortiously killed unless that child survives until
birth.10
This Note advocates that the current interpretation of Indiana’s
Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child Statute is flawed and produces
inequitable results, and should be amended by the state legislature to
advance a more just and logical approach.11 Part II of this Note
highlights the progression of both the rights of the unborn child and
7
See generally Jill D. Washburn Helbling, Note, To Recover or not to Recover: A State by
State Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363 (1996). Washburn’s Note
surveys different approaches states have taken when addressing the issue of fetal wrongful
death claims. Id. at 366. Three prominent approaches are utilized by the states: the born
alive rule, the viability rule, and the pre-viability rule; each takes drastically different views
of compensating parents for the loss of their unborn child. Id. at 429–30. See infra Part II.C
(discussing the application and use of the three approaches to fetal wrongful death).
8
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 495 (1989) (reestablishing the
proposition that states have a compelling interest in protecting the life of the unborn). But
see Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122,133 (Cal. 1977) (advancing the proposition that damages
resulting from the loss of a fetus are too speculative to quantify; therefore, states should
deny recovery under a theory of fetal wrongful death).
9
See infra Part II.C.2 (identifying the states that allow fetal wrongful death recovery if a
child is viable). See Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 2002). Indiana allowed fetal
wrongful death recovery from 1972 to 2002. Id. at 207. In Bolin, the Indiana Supreme Court
ruled that the legislature intended recovery for only children that received a prenatal injury
and survived until a live birth, reversing thirty years of established law in the state. Id.
10
See Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 207 (stating the current position of Indiana law regarding fetal
wrongful death). See also Raina Weaver, Note, Torts—Wrongful Death—The Birth of Fetal
Rights under Arkansas’s Wrongful Death Statute: The Arkansas Supreme Court Recognizes a
Fetus as a “Person.” Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001), 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 359 (2002). Weaver’s Note contends that the overriding reason
for overturning Arkansas’s historical adherence to the born alive rule was the inconsistent
treatment of fetuses in Arkansas law. Id. at 379. Arkansas realized the need for consistent
protection of the unborn under its laws and amended several sections so as to protect
viable fetuses in every portion of Arkansas law except abortion, due to federal
constitutional constraints. Id. at 384.
11
IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (2008).
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wrongful death statutes until they merge in fetal wrongful death
statutes, focusing on Indiana law.12 Part III analyzes the Indiana
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state’s current child wrongful
death statute, criticizing the court’s decision to revert from a viability
approach to the common law born-alive approach.13 Part IV proposes
that Indiana reestablish the viability approach it followed for thirty years
and introduces a model amendment which could be added to the state’s
child wrongful death statute to achieve this goal.14
II. BACKGROUND OF FETAL PROTECTION AND CIVIL RESPONSES IN INDIANA
Modern moral understandings and technological advances have
largely contributed to the recognition and growth of fetal rights in a
majority of American states that were inconceivable throughout most of
our history.15 Criminal law was the first to recognize the rights of the
fetus in ancient times, and these rights have expanded today to protect
the unborn in various areas of criminal and civil law, culminating with
wrongful death causes of action.16 Though fetal rights are expanding to

See generally infra Part II. Parts II.A–B begin by examining the historical development
of fetal rights which have expanded exponentially in the latter part of the twentieth
century. Id. Part II.C examines the introduction of wrongful death statutes into the United
States and its development into a mechanism for compensating parents for the negligent
death of their fetus. Id. Part II.D examines the development of wrongful death and fetal
rights in Indiana leading to the state’s current child wrongful death statute. Id.
13
See infra Part III (arguing that the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state’s
child wrongful death statute is incorrect and in violation of the state’s Equal Privileges
Clause).
14
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to Indiana’s wrongful death statute to
clarify the legislature’s intent of utilizing a viability approach).
15
See White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1969). “An unborn child is a part of its
mother until birth and thus has no juridicial existence. This proposition has no scientific or
medical basis in fact and has been expressly rejected by numerous authorities.” Id.
(citations omitted). See also Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 397 (D.C.
1984) (holding that because a cause of action arises for prenatal injuries if the child survives
until live birth, there is no reason to cut off the right to be free from tortious injury simply
because the injury is severe enough to cause death).
16
See generally Jennifer A. Brobst, Note, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of
Violence Act in North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127 (2006). Brobst’s Note examines the
progression of fetal rights in criminal and civil law. Id. at 130–32. The Note identifies that
fetal rights are protected to some extent in homicide, civil, child endangerment, and
abortion law. Id. at 127. See Ronen Perry, Note, It’s a Wonderful Life, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
329 (2007-2008). This Article analyzes another emerging area of fetal rights—wrongful life.
Id at 329. Contrary to wrongful death claims, wrongful life claims ask the question of
whether a severely disabled child has been harmed by the mere fact that it was born. Id. at
331. Wrongful life is a tort action against another person who negligently enabled the
child’s birth when there were reasons to believe the mother would have terminated if she
had known all the facts. Id. For multiple reasons, few states recognize a cause of action for
12
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unprecedented areas through legislative and judicial initiative, Indiana is
among a small minority of states that has yet to advance fetal protection
into the area of wrongful death consistent with contemporary
standards.17 Part II.A begins with a classical examination of fetal rights
leading to the expansion of fetal rights after the Roe v. Wade decision
examined in Part II.B. Part II.C discusses the different approaches
jurisdictions have taken when assessing whether wrongful death actions
are permitted for the death of a fetus. Finally, Part II.D examines
Indiana’s contradictory and inconsistent approach to defining a person
for the purposes of its wrongful death statutes, more specifically
Indiana’s current Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child Statute.18

wrongful life, but a primary reason is that a child is suing an individual that had nothing to
do with the cause of the abnormality or sickness from which the child is suffering. Id.
17
See infra Part II.C.1 (listing the fourteen states which still follow the common law bornalive approach).
18
IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (2008). Indiana’s Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child Statute
reads:
Sec. 1. (a) As used in this section, "child" means an unmarried
individual without dependents who is:
(1) less than twenty (20) years of age; or
(2) less than twenty-three (23) years of age and is enrolled in a
postsecondary educational institution or a career and technical
education school or program that is not a postsecondary
educational program.
(b) An action may be maintained under this section against the person
whose wrongful act or omission caused the injury or death of a child.
The action may be maintained by:
(1) the father and mother jointly, or either of them by naming the
other parent as a codefendant to answer as to his or her interest;
(2) in case of divorce or dissolution of marriage, the person to
whom custody of the child was awarded; and
(3) a guardian, for the injury or death of a protected person.
(c) In case of death of the person to whom custody of a child was
awarded, a personal representative shall be appointed to maintain the
action for the injury or death of the child.
(d) In an action brought by a guardian for an injury to a protected
person, the damages inure to the benefit of the protected person.
(e) In an action to recover for the death of a child, the plaintiff may
recover damages:
(1) for the loss of the child's services;
(2) for the loss of the child's love and companionship; and
(3) to pay the expenses of:
(A) health care and hospitalization necessitated by the
wrongful act or omission that caused the child's death;
(B) the child's funeral and burial;
(C) the reasonable expense of psychiatric and psychological
counseling incurred by a surviving parent or minor sibling
of the child that is required because of the death of the child;
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A. Classical Application of the Law to the Unborn
Our historical concepts of protecting fetal rights are a far cry from
modern understandings that extend protection of the unborn into tort
claims such as wrongful death.19 The traditional line defining the
difference between a legally recognized human being and a fetus, which
had no legal identity outside its mother, was the quickening of a child
within its mother’s womb.20 The rationale for this early definition was
(D) uninsured debts of the child, including debts for which a
parent is obligated on behalf of the child; and
(E) the administration of the child's estate, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
(f) Damages may be awarded under this section only with respect to
the period of time from the death of the child until:
(1) the date that the child would have reached:
(A) twenty (20) years of age; or
(B) twenty-three (23) years of age, if the child was enrolled in
a postsecondary educational institution or in a career and
technical education school or program that is not a
postsecondary educational program; or
(2) the date of the child's last surviving parent's death;
whichever first occurs.
(g) Damages may be awarded under subsection (e)(2) only with
respect to the period of time from the death of the child until the date
of the child's last surviving parent's death.
(h) Damages awarded under subsection (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3)(C), and
(e)(3)(D) inure to the benefit of:
(1) the father and mother jointly if both parents had custody of
the child;
(2) the custodial parent, or custodial grandparent, and the
noncustodial parent of the deceased child as apportioned by the
court according to their respective losses; or
(3) a custodial grandparent of the child if the child was not
survived by a parent entitled to benefit under this section.
However, a parent or grandparent who abandoned a deceased child
while the child was alive is not entitled to any recovery under this
chapter.
Id.
Cari L. Leventhal, Comment, The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act: Recognizing
Potential Human Life in Pennsylvania Criminal Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 173, 175–79 (1998).
Under English common law, homicide was the killing of a human by another human. Id. at
175. Because a fetus was not considered a “person” or a “reasonable creature in being[,]”
killing it was not regarded as homicide. Id. (quotations omitted). See also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
20
Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 19,
at *129) (noting that the killing of a “quick” fetus was not considered murder under ancient
law, yet rose to the lesser crimes of homicide or manslaughter). The biblical passage from
the Apostles’ Creed, “From thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead[,]” may
have provided the rationale for ancient lawmakers to convey a legal identity upon a
“quick” fetus. Brobst, supra note 16, at 131 (footnote omitted).
19
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believed to stem more from an acceptance of the inability to medically
determine when a fetus was alive, or if outside factors contributed to its
death rather then moral and ethical beliefs concerning the beginning of
life.21 This early formulation of a line defining legal identity did not
carry over to the law developing in the American colonies.22 The
accepted rule in American common law, which also had roots reaching
back many centuries, was “that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not a
homicide.”23 Rather than recognize a legal identity at the time of
quickening, American law accepted its own inability to medically
determine the difficult questions of whether a fetus was alive, and
whether a certain action resulted in the death of the fetus by denying
recovery unless a child was born alive and perished after that point as a
result of the injuries it sustained.24 Indeed, at early common law, the
fetus had no rights, either criminal or civil, in American jurisdictions.25
21
See Philip A. Rafferty, Roe v. Wade: A Scandal upon the Court, Part I: The Unsettling of
Roe v. Wade, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 3 (2005) (noting that the competing rationale
given for not bestowing a legal identity until a child had quickened was a religious belief
that the body and soul did not infuse until the child was perfectly formed).
22
See Michigan v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). In describing the
early application of the born alive rule in the United States, the court stated,
[]In the United States the ‘born alive’ requirement has come to
mean that the fetus be fully brought forth and establish an
‘independent circulation’ before it can be considered a human being.
Proof of live birth and death by criminal agency are required beyond a
reasonable doubt to sustain a homicide conviction. ‘Independent
circulation’ can be established by evidence of the fetus having
breathed, but such proof usually is not conclusive in the absence of the
evidence of life, such as crying.
Id. (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 67, pp. 530–31). Though the court through
dicta described the born alive rule as archaic and expressed a desire to change the rule, it
was bound by precedent and upheld the current application of the law, which did not
confer a legal identity on a fetus Id. at 780–81.
23
Massachusetts v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984). E.g., New Mexico v. Willis,
652 P.2d 1222, 1223 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (“The early common law did not attach human
status to a fetus[.]”); Michigan v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 776 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(quotation omitted) (“No appellate court of the United States or England has ever, as a
matter of common law definition, treated a fetus as a person for the purpose of criminal
law.”); Ohio v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 601 (Ohio 1971) (“[Ohio laws do not] include an
unborn child in the category of persons against whom the crime of homicide could be
committed.”).
24
Nebraska v. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Neb. 1980) (holding that technology at the time
was unable to distinguish between stillborn children that perished due to natural causes
and those that perished due to injuries inflicted upon the pregnant woman during
gestation, and, therefore, finding that any conclusion on this matter was based on
circumstantial evidence and mere speculation).
25
See Indiana v. Soale, 74 N.E. 1111, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1905) (“Personal rights of an
infant do not occur until birth. Up to that time personal rights of an infant are not
distinguishable from those of the mother.”); Canfield v. State, 56 Ind. 168, 170 (Ind. 1877)
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Indiana was no different from the rest of the country by denying a
legal identity to the unborn.26 In Canfield v. State, the Indiana Court of
Appeals attempted to advocate a progressive position by awarding a
woman damages when the father was ruled to have killed the child by
abandoning the unwed mother during pregnancy.27 Indiana’s Supreme
Court overruled the judgment, stating that “the foetus in utero never
became a child within the meaning of the law authorizing proceedings
for the maintenance of the bastard children after their birth.”28
Therefore, to support an indictment for feticide in Indiana, the child had
to be born alive and subsequently die from its wounds sustained during
gestation.29 It would be many years until Indiana and the rest of the
states would abandon the common law notion that criminal or civil
liability for harming a fetus could occur only if that fetus was
subsequently born alive.30
B. Roe v. Wade and the Expansion of Fetal Rights
The traditional rules gradually gave way and were replaced by more
contemporary theories of how to define a person for purposes of legal
identity.31 The first areas of law to begin protecting the unborn focused

(“[U]ntil a child is wholly born, and has attained an independent circulation and existence,
it is but a foetus in utero, and not a human being within the meaning of the law defining the
several grades of homicide.”).
26
See infra Part II.D (identifying Indiana’s early trends of denying a legal identity to the
unborn).
27
56 Ind. at 168. Though the case illustrates an antiquated law against premarital sex
and abandoning a child, legally termed “bastardy,” the case identifies what Indiana
required for legal identity. Id. A child’s lungs had to fill with air before the child could be
considered a legal person for purposes of Indiana law. Id. at 170.
28
Id. at 171. Although the court did not hold the father responsible for the child’s death
because the child was never a legally identified person, the court attempted to compensate
the woman by holding the father liable for the costs associated with her pregnancy. Id.
29
Id. at 170. The court held that the term “life” was synonymous with the term
“respiration.” Id. Therefore, the father was not held responsible for the child’s death
because the child’s lungs were never inflated with air. Id. at 171.
30
See Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 20 (Ind. Ct. App 1971). Although Indiana had
consistently followed the born alive approach to conferring a legal identity on individuals,
the court, as a matter of first impression, was asked to interpret the term “person” in the
wrongful death statute as including viable, unborn children. Id. at 21. Because the
legislative record was silent on the matter, the court determined it had the duty to decide
the rule and concluded that in equity a father should be allowed to recover for the
wrongful death of his viable, unborn child. Id.
31
See infra Part II.C (identifying the three most common approaches states use to
recognize legal identity for purposes of wrongful death). See, e.g., Bolin v. Wingert, 764
N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind. 2002) (providing an example of a state following the born-alive
approach); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 790 (S.D. 1996) (providing an
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not on the potential life of the unborn child, but centered on protecting
the mother or other living individuals.32 Prior to the general spread of
antibiotics in the 1940s, criminal abortion statutes were passed because
of the high mortality rate associated with such procedures, not to protect
the potential life of the fetus.33 Property law recognized fetuses for the
purpose of keeping wealth with the living members of a family, not to
protect the fetus’s interests.34 Though states were willing to protect
living individuals when passing laws which centered on the unborn,
states were not as willing to pass laws specifically intended to protect the
potential life of an unborn child.35
At first glance, the holding in Roe v. Wade appears to be a setback for
proponents of granting the unborn full protection under the law, yet this
historical case supplied the justification for the expansion of laws
protecting the unborn.36 Although Roe recognized that the fundamental
example of a state following the pre-viability approach); O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785,
787 (Mich. 1971) (providing an example of a state following the viability approach).
32
See Mississippi State Bd. of Health v. Johnson, 19 So.2d 445, 447 (Miss. 1944) (revoking
defendant’s license to practice medicine after he performed an abortion which could have
jeopardized the patient’s life; the doctor was not disciplined or even criticized for
terminating the pregnancy).
33
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973). It has been argued that Texas’s real concern in
enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman from submitting to a
procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy. Id. at 148-49. “The State has a legitimate
interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under
circumstances that insure [sic] maximum safety for the patient.” Id. at 150. See Steven G.
Calabresi, How to Reverse Government Imposition of Immorality: A Strategy for Eroding Roe v.
Wade, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (2008). Roe was a controversial holding when it was
decided in 1973. Id. at 85. One author, Steven Calabresi believes the holding in Roe goes
against the general trends in American law. Id. Specifically, Calabresi contends that
American law is based on positive law, and the holding of Roe goes against this general
trend by supporting an immoral law. Id.
34
See Ayelet Shachar, The Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World, 8 THER. INQ. L. 367,
385 (2007). During medieval times, access to wealth and political participation was
controlled by one’s status as a citizen. Id. The legal concept of fee tails, or the automatic
passage of an estate and citizenship to the heirs of one’s body, was created during this time
to ensure that ordinary people did not have access to the political system or wealth. Id.
Therefore, rather than creating these inheritance laws to protect any unborn progeny a
person might have, laws were passed to continue to restrict wealth among a small class of
individuals who had no desire to share their power. Id.
35
See generally Rafferty, supra note 21, at 2 (recognizing that historically, medical
technology was incapable of determining many difficult questions regarding the potential
life of a fetus, and theological viewpoints differed dramatically on this issue; as a result,
laws were not passed to protect fetuses).
36
410 U.S. at 113. Roe involved a challenge to a Texas statute which criminalized
abortions. Id. at 117–18. Petitioners argued that the United States Constitution guaranteed
their right to personal privacy which includes the right to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy. Id. at 120. The state argued that its criminal abortion statute was passed to
protect both the life of the mother and the potential life of the unborn child, both of which
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right of privacy limited a state’s right to ban or criminalize abortions, it
also clarified that states had a compelling interest to protect the potential
for human life at the point of viability, taking recent decisions into
account.37 Following the guidelines adopted by Roe and its progeny,
many states expanded their protection of the unborn into areas of the
law which historically offered little or no protection to the fetus.38
Classically, homicide law offered no protection to a fetus that was
not subsequently born alive.39 Today, thirty-four of the fifty states have
enacted statutes that to some extent criminalize killing of an unborn
child.40 On May 5, 1995, Indiana passed its own feticide statute, which
were compelling interests sufficient to overcome strict scrutiny. Id. at 122. The Supreme
Court ruled for the petitioners up until the third trimester of pregnancy where the Court
held the state’s compelling interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn child
outweighed the pregnant woman’s right of privacy in most situations. Id. at 164.
37
Id. at 162–63. The court placed no limitations upon states as to when their interest in
protecting prenatal life began, thereby allowing the states to protect the unborn from the
point of conception in other areas of the law. Id. The Supreme Court found a compelling
interest in protecting prenatal life, yet the holding of the case also acknowledged that
women have a fundamental right to private autonomy that outweighs the state’s interest to
a certain degree. Id.
38
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2007) (Florida’s feticide statute allows a charge
of murder for the killing of a quick fetus); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (2003 & Supp. 2006)
(Georgia’s statute provides that the killing of any prenatal child, regardless of its stage of
development, is murder); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (2006) (Illinois’s feticide statute
allows recovery for killing any prenatal child, regardless of its stage of development).
39
See Canfield v. Indiana, 56 Ind. 168, 168 (Ind. 1877) (according to the court, a fetus did
not become a living person until its lungs were filled with air).
40
Roger J. Magnuson & Joshua M. Lederman, Aristotle, Abortion, and Fetal Rights, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 767, 770 (2007). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.150 (2006) (homicide
statute includes pre-viable fetuses); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1102 (2001 & Supp. 2006)
(homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a) (2006)
(homicide statute includes fetuses twelve weeks or greater); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
1999) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2007)
(homicide statute includes quick fetuses); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-28 (2003 & Supp. 2006)
(homicide statute includes pre-viable fetus); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004) (homicide
statute includes pre-viable fetuses); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (2006) (homicide statute
includes pre-viable fetuses); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-6 (2008) (homicide statute includes viable
fetuses); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5
(1997 & Supp. 2007) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (homicide statute includes viable fetuses); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.322 (2004) (interpreted to include viable fetuses); MINN. STAT. § 609.266–
2691 (2006) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(d)
(2006) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000)
(stating that an unborn child is a “person,” construed to apply to manslaughter and
murder statutes in State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1992) and State v. Holcomb, 956
S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App. 1997)); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-391 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp.
2006) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.210 (West
2006) (homicide statute includes quick fetuses); N.D. CENT. CODE § § 12.1-17.1-01 to 12.117.1-06 (1997) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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criminalized the intentional killing of a viable fetus.41 Following the
evolving trend taking place in the states, the federal government enacted
its Protection of the Unborn Child Statute, more commonly referred to as
“Laci and Conner’s Law[.]”42
After fetal rights found their place in criminal law, protection for the
unborn began emerging in different areas of the civil law.43 Property law
has long recognized the rights of the unborn, yet states now began
expanding the protections offered under this area of the law.44 Apart
§ § 2903.01–06 (West 2007) (homicide statute includes viable fetuses); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 691 (West Supp. 2007) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2601–2609 (West 2006) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (2002) (homicide statute includes quick fetuses); S.C. CODE ANN. § 163-1083 (Supp. 2006) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-16-1.1 (2006) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13107 (2006) (homicide statute includes viable fetuses); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § § 1.07, 19.01
(Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-201 (2003) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-32.2 (2004) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West 2000) (homicide statute includes quick fetuses); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-2-30 (LexisNexis 2005) (homicide statute includes pre-viable fetuses); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ § 940.01–02, 940.04–06 (West 2005) (homicide statute includes quick fetuses);
Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004) (ruling that a viable fetus is a
“person” for purposes of Kentucky’s homicide statute); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536
N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989) (holding that the killing of a viable unborn child is “murder”
under the common-law definition of the term).
41
IND. CODE § 35-42-1-6 (2008). This section states, “A person who knowingly or
intentionally terminates a human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live
birth or to remove a dead fetus commits feticide . . . . This section does not apply to an
abortion[.]” Id.
42
18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006). Although unsuccessful attempts had been made to adopt a
federal feticide statute as recently as 1999 and 2001, the murder of the pregnant Laci
Peterson by her husband Scott Peterson pressured Congress to pass the Federal Unborn
Victim’s Act, enacted two years after Laci’s death. Amy Lotierzo, Comment, The Unborn
Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in Light of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79
TEMP. L. REV. 279, 281-83 (2006). The House had passed the Unborn Victim’s of Violence
Act in 1999 and again in 2001, yet members of the Senate stopped the legislation because
they believed its passage would erode women’s rights. Id. at 282. The disappearance of
Laci Peterson in 2001 sparked a media frenzy, and her husband Scott was convicted of
murder in 2003 after Laci’s body was finally discovered. Id. With this pressure on
Congress, both houses passed the bill, with President Bush stating, “The suffering of two
victims can never equal only one offense.” Id. (footnote omitted). See generally Jason
Dearen, Prosecutor Presents Closing Arguments, SAN MATEO COUNTY TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at
A1 (discussing the outcome of the Peterson murder trial and the effect on the jury of Laci
Peterson being pregnant with her child, Conner, when she was murdered).
43
Brobst, supra note 16, at 144–47 (examining the expansion of fetal rights in wrongful
death actions).
44
Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). In determining whether a
wrongful death action should be allowed for parents of an unborn child, the Texas court
examined other areas of its law which protected the unborn. Id. The court found that an
unborn child’s property rights have been recognized in the state for more than 200 years.
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from simply inheriting land, states have expanded property rights to
allow fetuses to be represented in probate court to contest claims against
their inheritance, inherit property from a deceased parent, and even
disclaim the legal right to inherit property.45
As with property law, rights for the unborn have emerged in family
law. In the case of Whitner v. State, a mother ingested crack cocaine
during her pregnancy and her child was subsequently born with a
dependency on the drug.46 South Carolina’s Supreme Court interpreted
its child abuse and endangerment statute to include a viable fetus under
the term “person” and sentenced the mother to eight years
imprisonment.47 Jurisdictions differ dramatically on the issue of
criminally prosecuting a mother for decisions she makes upon her own
body—some allow criminal prosecution; some proscribe drug treatment
for the mother; and other jurisdictions hold a pregnant woman’s
autonomy as deserving more protection than the unborn child.48 Indiana
follows those states which do not allow a criminal prosecution for a

Id. “Even without the sophistication of modern technology, courts over 200 years ago
recognized that a viable unborn child in the womb is the same as a child in the flesh.” Id. at
275 n.12. (quoting Nelson v. Galveston, 14 S.W. 1021, 1021–23 (Tex. 1890)).
45
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 34A (Vernon 2001). See Parvin, 7 S.W.3d at 275 (interpreting
the Texas probate statute to allow an unborn child to receive an appointed attorney ad
litem to protect his interest even if the child may never be born). See also TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 112.010 (Vernon 2007) (allows an unborn child, through an appointed
representative, to make decisions regarding trusts in which he or she is the beneficiary);
James v. James, 164 S.W. 47, 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (allowing three children who were
born many years after their grandfather had passed to inherit their grandfather’s property,
even though the grandfather never knew they existed).
46
492 S.E.2d 777, 778−79 (S.C. 1997) (expanding South Carolina’s child neglect statute to
include a viable fetus).
47
Id. The court examined how different jurisdictions have approached the difficult
question of whether a mother can be held responsible for damaging a fetus through acts
she takes upon her own body. Id. at 782. The court compared Massachusetts law, which
allows recovery in certain circumstances, to other states, such as Florida, which does not
allow recovery for acts the mother inflicts upon her own body. Id. at 783. The court also
addressed the “slippery slope” argument which addressed whether a mother can be
prosecuted for using controlled substances while pregnant, posing the question of what is
next. Id. at 782-84. The defendant’s argument was whether criminalizing the use of crack
cocaine would lead to criminal prosecutions for pregnant women drinking or smoking. Id.
at 781−82. See In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a child
born with controlled substance in its blood was an abused person for purposes of its child
abuse statute). But see Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (court did not allow
prosecution when mother damaged her fetus through passing cocaine through the
umbilical cord). See generally Moses Cook, Note, From Conception Until Birth: Exploring the
Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307 (2002) (advocating drug
treatment rather than imprisonment for pregnant women who use controlled substances).
48
See supra note 47 (providing examples of different methodologies for handling
pregnant women who harm their child for illegal acts taken on their own bodies).
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mother’s ingestion of a controlled substance that subsequently injures or
even terminates a pregnancy.49
With the expansion of statutes protecting prenatal life in homicide,
property, and family law, the unborn are legally defended to a greater
extent now than at any point in history.50 The most recent trend taking
hold in the majority of the states is expanding wrongful death statutes to
include the parents of a fetus that was wrongfully killed in the class of
individuals who can recover for their loss.51
C. Fetal Wrongful Death Actions
Just as laws which protected the unborn were unknown to the
common law, wrongful death also was not a historically recognized
cause of action.52 A wrongful death action is “[a] lawsuit brought on
behalf of a decedent’s survivors for their damages resulting from a
tortious injury that caused the decedent’s death.”53 Under English
common law, no cause of action existed for wrongful death because the
claim was considered to have died with the victim.54 “The result was
Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The court interpreted IND.
CODE section 35-46-1-1 (2008) as not including an unborn child within the meaning of the
word “dependent” for purposes of a child abuse or neglect statute. Id. Although the court
expressed a desire to criminalize the reprehensible conduct of the mother, who ingested
crack cocaine which killed her unborn child, the court acknowledged that all crimes are
statutory and indicated that it was powerless to punish the mother until the legislature
acted. Id. Unfortunately, because the mother did sufficient damage to kill the fetus before
it was born, the mother avoided criminal liability for her act which would have followed
had the child been born alive. Id.
50
See supra notes 42, 45, 47 and accompanying text (identifying cases and articles
explaining the expansion of fetal rights in homicide, property, and family law).
51
See infra Part II.C (explaining the history and application of fetal wrongful death
statutes); Helbling, supra note 7. Helbling’s Note identifies the current application and
justification that every state gives for its fetal wrongful death statute. Helbling, supra note
7, at 367-429. The Note highlights the current trend toward allowing wrongful death
recovery at the point of viability in a large majority of jurisdictions. Id.
52
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 127. See, e.g., Lotierzo, supra note 42, at 288. The Note
shows that until 1949, the law did not recognize a duty owed to the fetus. Id. The law did
not recognize a fetus as a living being, and therefore, if a prenatal injury occurred and the
child was born and subsequently died of that injury, there could be no cause of action
because the child was not a person when the injury was received. Id.
53
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1644 (8th ed. 2004).
54
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 940–42. There were three harsh results that stemmed
from the common law’s denial of wrongful death statutes. Id. Specifically,
The common law of England enforced three restrictive rules
concerning the death of a person in personal injury cases:
1. If the tortfeasor died before the victim recovered for the tort,
the victim’s right of action died with him.
2. If the victim of a tort himself died (from whatever cause)
before he recovered in tort, the victim’s right of action also died.
49
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that it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure
him, and that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of
the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a remedy.”55 This
injustice was finally remedied in 1846 when England enacted its
wrongful death statute, more commonly referred to as Lord Campbell’s
Act.56 The purpose behind creating an action for wrongful death was to
compensate those individuals who were dependent on the person
negligently killed with financial support and also to compensate them
for their loss.57
It was not until well after the enactment of Lord Campbell’s Act that
New York became the first American jurisdiction to enact a wrongful
death statute.58 The first American wrongful death statutes were nearly
identical to Lord Campbell’s Act in that they provided damages to
compensate for only the economic benefit the decedent would have
provided for the family; they did not offer damages for any emotional
harm the survivors may have suffered.59 It was not long until wrongful
3. If the tortfeasor caused a victim’s death, relatives and
dependants of the victim who were deprived of financial support or
who suffered emotional loss, had no cause of action of their own.
Id. at 940 (footnotes omitted). As a result, there was no civil cause of action for the death of
a human being at common law. Id. at 940. It really was true that killing an individual was
less costly, in terms of civil liability, than not killing that same individual. Id. at 942.
55
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 945. The old rationale that it was cheaper to kill
another human than to scratch him led to the creation of the myth about old railroad cars.
Id. at 942 n.24. It was said that the reason passengers slept with their heads facing the aisles
in old Pullman cars was that in the event of an accident, the conductor could grab one of
the fire axes provided in each car and efficiently deal with those who where merely injured.
Id.
56
22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 4 (West 2007). Until the passage of Lord Campbell’s Act in
England, there were no wrongful death statutes in the United States. Id. After its passage,
wrongful death liability quickly expanded, with every state in the United States having
enacted some sort of wrongful death statute. Id.
57
Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 66 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Mo. 1933). A competing
rationale for wrongful death actions at the time was to “preserve life from the perils of our
modern mechanical age by providing a penalty for negligently killing a human being[.]”
Id. (citation omitted). Nonetheless, every wrongful death statute limited the individuals
who could recover under its provisions, showing that these statutes were passed out of
need to compensate survivors rather than to punish newly forming industries. Id.
58
See Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S.754 (1877). Early authorities adopted the
position that the killing of a human being resulted in no civil damages. Id. at 756. Yet, the
court in Brame followed decisions in Connecticut and New York which followed Lord
Campbell’s Act in allowing recovery for the damages resulting from the death of a human
being. Id. at 757.
59
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 949–54. See, e.g., Miller v. Mayberry, 506 N.E.2d 7, 11
(Ind. 1987) (determining that although the parents were successful in their wrongful death
action for the death of their child, the court awarded the couple no damages because it was
impossible to speculate the potential economic benefit that the child would have provided
the parents—their emotional harm was not a compensable damage).
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death claims evolved into a vehicle to compensate survivors for noneconomic losses such as loss of companionship, guidance, and conjugal
relations.60 Krouse v. Graham, a California Supreme Court case, was one
of the first decisions that quantified a survivor’s emotional pain and
suffering into damages recoverable in a wrongful death action.61 The
court awarded reasonable compensation in this case for a husband’s loss
of love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, moral support,
sexual relations, and maintenance of everyday activities which were all
non-pecuniary losses on top of the pecuniary losses he suffered.62
With wrongful death claims evolving to a point where nonpecuniary losses were being compensated, the next question that
emerged was whether wrongful death claims could be utilized to offer
some compensation for the harm suffered by parents whose unborn
child is killed by the negligent acts of another.63 The first American case
addressing this issue was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, in which
a woman who was four to five months pregnant tripped on a negligently
maintained sidewalk that was unreasonably dangerous.64 The child she
was carrying was injured in the fall, but survived until birth, and then
died from the injuries it suffered in the fall.65 Since the child was still
60
Elliott v. Willis, 442 N.E.2d 163, 168 (Ill. 1982). The trial court stated the law at the
time when it found that pain and suffering, loss of society, and grief and sorrow were not
compensable damages. Id. at 164. Yet, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that loss
of consortium was a unique damage suffered by a husband or a wife and found that equity
required that his loss of guidance, comfort, and sexual relations should be compensated.
Id. at 166. The court went even further in expanding compensable damages resulting from
special relationship such as father-son, husband-wife, or parent-child. Id. at 166-68.
61
562 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Cal. 1977). Plaintiff, his wife, and their five children were
unloading groceries from the trunk of their vehicle when the defendant drove his vehicle at
such a speed to propel the plaintiff’s parked vehicle seventy feet forward. Id. The
plaintiff’s wife was killed in the collision that was witnessed by the plaintiff, his children,
and their neighbor. Id. The plaintiff asked the court for compensation for his children’s
and his own emotional damages. Id. The court found that the damages recoverable under
wrongful death needed to be expanded to cover non-pecuniary injuries such as those
suffered by the plaintiff and his children. Id. at 1027.
62
Id. at 1025 (reasonable compensation in this case was determined to be $442,000 rather
than the nominal amount the family would have been awarded if only punitive damages
had been available).
63
See generally Washburn, supra note 7 (examining the history and progression of fetal
wrongful death actions).
64
138 Mass. 14, 14 (Mass. 1884), overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co. 225
N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967). The court made analogies to the criminal law, which did not
allow the prosecution of an individual for killing a fetus. Id. at 15. Applying the concept
that the mother and the child were one at the time she fell, the court denied the mother
recovery for the wrongful death of her child even though the child was born and survived
for a few minutes outside of her body. Id. at 16.
65
Id. at 15. See also Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that a child was killed by its mother’s use of controlled substances, yet the court was
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inside his mother when the injury occurred, the court determined that
the child and its mother were one entity and therefore only the mother
was injured in the fall, not the child, and denied recovery.66
The notion that a child and its mother were one entity precluded any
fetal wrongful death suits until the District Court of District of Columbia
in Bonbrest v. Kotz explicitly rejected the idea that a child could not be
legally injured until birth.67 The court recognized that a fetus could be
injured during gestation, yet the law at the time offered no relief for
injuries inflicted upon a child before birth, an injury which the law
afforded no compensation.68 The court reasoned that if the fetus
survives until birth and suffers from injuries it sustained before birth, the
law should abandon the notion that a child is an extension of its mother

unable to award damages because, for purposes of Indiana’s child endangerment statute, a
child and its mother are one until the child is born).
66
Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17. The plaintiff prayed for recovery, following the common law
of England as stated by Lord Coke: “If a woman is quick with child, and takes a potion, or
if a man beats her, and the child is born alive and dies of the potion or battery, this is
murder.” Id. at 15. The court denied her request, however, because it found similar
authorities that treated the mother and the child as one entity because it was impossible at
the time to medically determine independent life before birth. Id. at 16.
67
65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946). Although the common law in the jurisdiction
stated that prenatal injuries were afforded no basis for an action in tort, the court found the
reasoning for this rule dispositive. Id. at 139. The court allowed a mother to recover
damages because her child was injured while he was viable and survived until birth. Id. at
141. In justifying its reasoning, the court explained,
The wrongful act which constitutes the crime may constitute also
a tort, and if the law recognizes the separate existence of the unborn
child sufficiently to punish the crime, it is difficult to see why it should
not also recognize its separate existence for the purpose of redressing
the tort.
Id. (quotation omitted).
68
Id. at 139. The court, recognizing the inequity created by the common law, reasoned,
If a child after birth [] has no right of action for prenatal injuries,
we have a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy, for, although
the father may be entitled to compensation for the loss he has incurred
and the mother for what she has suffered, yet there is a residuum of
injury for which compensation cannot be had save at the suit of the
child. If a right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled,
without any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of
another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and
inconvenience without any compensation therefor. To my mind it is
but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable [] should be
allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrongfully
committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother.
Id. at 141–42. (quotation omitted) (footnotes omitted). Therefore, the court determined that
the common law perception that a child and its mother were one entity until birth was not
based in logic if a child could survive at the point of viability even if the mother perished.
Id. at 140.
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and offer a remedy to either the child or its survivors for the prenatal
injuries.69 Since Bonbrest’s holding that a fetus has a legal identity before
birth, states have taken three different approaches to awarding damages
to parents when their unborn child is killed by tortiously inflicted
prenatal injuries.70 The three approaches are the born-alive rule, the
viability rule, and the pre-viability rule.71
For demonstration, the hypothetical in Part I about Ashley losing her
unborn child in the car accident will be used to differentiate the three
approaches.72 Recall that John was the driver of the Mustang that hit
Ashley and her husband’s vehicle, resulting in the death of the couple’s
nearly six-month-old fetus.
John was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter for his actions, and drawing upon this hypothetical, the
following three sections will show that civil liability depends on the
approach the state utilizes to recognize a fetal wrongful death cause of
action.73
1.

The Born-Alive Rule

If John struck Ashley’s SUV in California, he would not be civilly
liable for their unborn child’s death because the fetus has no legal rights
until she draws her first breath.
California is among fourteen
jurisdictions that still adhere to the common law born-alive rule.74

Id. The court justified its reasoning for changing hundreds of years of adherence to
the common law rule by quoting Justice Holmes,
“[T]he life of the law has been not logic: it has been experience” and
here we find a willingness to face the facts of life rather than a myopic
and specious resort to precedent to avoid attachment of responsibility
where it ought to attach and to permit idiocy, imbecility, paralysis, loss
of function, and like residuals of another's negligence to be locked in
the limbo of uncompensable wrong, because of a legal fiction, long
outmoded.
Id. at 142 (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
70
See infra Parts II.C.1−3 (discussing the born-alive, viability, and pre-viability
approaches to fetal wrongful death).
71
See infra Parts II.C.1−3 (identifying these three approaches to fetal wrongful death and
setting forth which states adhere to each test).
72
See supra Part I (introducing the hypothetical at the beginning of the Note).
73
See infra Parts II.C.1−3. See Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 701 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (criticizing Indiana’s law for holding individuals criminally liable for killing an
unborn child while simultaneously finding that the same individual owes no civil duty to
the parents for the same reckless act).
74
Amber N. Dina, Note, Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embryo: Why
Illinois is on the Cutting Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embroyonic Legal Rights,
19 REGENT U. L. REV. 251, 255 n.40 (2007) (Alaska, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming are the
fourteen jurisdictions that still require a live birth for a wrongful death claim).
69
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Under this rule, “an unborn child is a part of the mother until birth
and . . . injury to an unborn child constitutes injury to the mother
and . . . she may recover for such physical injury and mental suffering
associated with a stillbirth.”75 The mother may recover for the injuries
she sustained in the act that terminated her pregnancy, but if the child
dies before birth, no legal remedy is available to compensate the parents
for the resulting emotional harm.76 Furthermore, because a cause of
action for wrongful death becomes feasible only when the child takes its
first breath, the father is precluded from any compensation for his pain
and suffering associated with losing his progeny if the child dies before
birth.77 Under the born-alive rule, even though John inflicted a sufficient
amount of damage to kill Ashley’s unborn child, Ashley is nonetheless
precluded from recovering for the lost compassion, love, and
companionship her child would have provided her but for John’s
reckless actions.78
The born-alive rule is justified by states because it avoids bringing
complicated medical issues into court, issues that in reality delve deeper
into perplexing moral and religious determinations about the status of
the unborn.79 By a wrongful death statute drawing a line for liability at
75
Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Va. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted). Plaintiff, a twenty-one-week-pregnant woman, was struck from behind
while operating a motor vehicle. Id. at 681. Circumstances led the doctors to believe that
the child’s life was in jeopardy, so they attempted to induce premature labor in an effort to
save the child. Id. The child was subsequently born alive, yet died a little over an hour
after delivery. Id. at 682. The court found the plaintiff, as the administrator of her child’s
estate, had a cause of action for wrongful death because the child was born alive, even if
the birth was induced through medical means before viability. Id. at 684.
76
Id. at 683. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946) (criticizing the fact
that children should have to survive until birth in order to recover for an injury sustained
while they were physically capable of surviving outside of their mother’s womb).
77
Kalafut, 389 S.E.2d at 684. Virginia courts decided to allow wrongful death actions if
the child was born alive, regardless of when the child received the injuries that eventually
caused its demise. Id. Other jurisdictions, however, declare that the fatal injury must occur
after the point of viability or quickening for a wrongful death action to be maintained. Id.
See Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703 (discussing how the born-alive rule may violate equal
protection clauses because fathers (males) are not compensated for harms they endure but
mothers (females) may be compensated for harms they endure).
78
See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that the application of the
common law wrongful death law resulted in the situation where it was cheaper for the
tortfeasor to kill the victim than to inflict a nonfatal injury).
79
Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916, 918–19 (Mont. 1984) (requiring the state legislature to
define when wrongful death is allowed because the cause of action is entirely a creature of
statute). See Nebraska v. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Neb. 1980). In Doyle, a mother was
convicted by the lower court of killing her child, yet this holding was overturned when it
was established that the evidence was incapable of proving the mother was responsible for
the child’s death. Id. Although it was obvious that the child died through the acts of the
mother, medical testimony was unable to provide a concrete answer as to the cause of the
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birth, it gives courts and citizens clear notice of when recovery is
available and when compensation will be denied.80 Furthermore,
liability is more easily assessed because medical testimony is not needed
to prove a child was viable when it died; the testimony is necessary only
to show the prenatal injury lead to the child’s death.81
Yet, the born alive rule has been criticized by scholars for advocating
the common law ideology that a prenatal child is simply a part of its
mother and possesses no intrinsic human value of its own.82 If John
would have injured the unborn child less severely and the child survived
until birth, dying shortly thereafter, Ashley and David would have a
child’s death. Id. Because medical technology at the time was not advanced enough to
concretely determine the cause of death of a fetus while still in the womb, the court
determined the born alive rule was the most logical test to produce fair and consistent
results in fetal wrongful death cases. Id. at 63.
80
See Kuhnke, 683 P.2d at 919 (the Montana Supreme Court limited its holding to civil
wrongful death actions, taking note that under criminal law a fetus was considered a
person and had legally defined rights); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303, 307 (Fla. 1977) (the
Florida Supreme Court concluded that the harsh application of not recognizing a fetus as a
person under Florida civil law promoted the state legislature’s goal of uniform application
of Florida law to wrongful death cases involving fetuses).
81
Kalafut, 389 S.E.2d at 684. Addressing the evidentiary standards in fetal wrongful
death cases, the court acknowledged,
[A]n action may be maintained for recovery of damages for any injury
occurring after conception, provided the tortious conduct and the
proximate cause of the harm can be established. Given the present
state of medical technology, however, the proof of causation obviously
becomes increasingly more difficult as the focus moves to the
beginning of pregnancy. But the difficulty of proving the facts should
not cause the denial of a right to bring the action. With the complex
litigation of today, trial courts are accustomed to applying evidentiary
rules and to adjudicating difficult sufficiency of the evidence questions
dealing with causation.
Id. (citation omitted). See Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703. Indiana courts have justified treating
fetuses differently from children born alive because of the different evidentiary standards
used to prove the causation of their injury or death. Id. Yet, the Horn court found this
reasoning illogical when Indiana’s murder statute requires the court to prove this same
causation that was being denied in tort law. Id. The court found that proving the
proximate cause of the death of a fetus is a routine activity that takes place daily in Indiana
courts along with other complicated medical issues. Id.
82
19 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS Wrongful Death of Fetus § 107 (1993). See Eich v. Town
of Gulf Shores, 300 So.2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1974). In criticizing the born-alive rule, the court in
Eich noted the inherent unfairness of allowing tortfeasors to escape liability by killing a
fetus rather than simply harming it. Id.
To deny recovery where the injury is so severe as to cause the death of
a fetus subsequently stillborn, and to allow recovery where injury
occurs during pregnancy and death results therefrom after a live birth,
would only serve the tortfeasor by rewarding him for his severity in
inflicting injury.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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wrongful death claim.83 But because John inflicted sufficient damage to
kill the child, the cause of action also perished.84 Thus, John’s civil
liability is less severe because he killed the child, exemplifying the
proposition that it is less costly to kill the victim than to scratch it.85
Because of this paradoxical result, “[a]ll writers who have discussed the
problem have joined in condemning the old rule, and maintaining that
an unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the
street as the mother, and in urging that recovery should be allowed upon
proper proof.”86
2.

Viability

If Ashley’s tragic accident occurred in Massachusetts, she would
have to prove that her child was viable at the time the accident occurred
in order to maintain a fetal wrongful death action.87 The majority of
jurisdictions, Massachusetts being among thirty states that adhere to this
rule, permit wrongful death actions for prenatal deaths if the child is
viable at the time the fatal injury occurs.88 Minnesota was the first state

See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the common law belief that no
action in tort arose from the killing of a human being because the claim died with the
person). But see Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 397 (D.C. 1984) (stating
that liability to the victim should not be extinguished through the fortuitous event of the
victim’s death).
84
See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the common law belief that no
action in tort arose from the killing of a human being because the claim died with the
person). See Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp., 482 A.2d at 396. At common law, the victim’s cause of
action for tortious injury was extinguished with his death. Id. Wrongful death and
survival statutes were enacted to avoid the harsh results stemming from the application of
the common law rule. Id.
85
See supra note 55 and accompanying text (addressing the criticism of the common law
that it was cheaper to kill an individual than to simply injure them).
86
Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1977) (citation omitted). See O’Grady v. Brown
654 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Mo. 1983). In overturning the born-alive rule followed by Missouri at
the time, the court in O’Grady noted that the loss suffered by parents of an unborn child is
as genuine and substantial as the loss suffered by parents of children who die shortly after
birth. Id. Furthermore, wrongful death statutes are present to place the cost of unsafe
activities on the tortfeasor and thereby create a deterrent to engaging in such activity. Id.
The timing of the defendant’s conduct does not change the injury suffered by the child or
the desirability of the conduct; it is equally wrong at any point. Id.
87
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992)
(defining viability as the ability of a child to sustain independent life separate from its
mother, and indicating that this usually takes place between twenty-three or twenty-four
weeks into a pregnancy).
88
Dina, supra note 74, at 255 n.41 (noting that Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
83
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to recognize a cause of action in wrongful death and compensate parents
for their emotional suffering resulting from the death of their unborn
child.89 In Verkennes v. Corniea, the wrongful death statute of Minnesota
was determined to allow for recovery for any person who was
wrongfully killed by the negligent acts of another, despite the
defendant’s argument that the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of
action because the fetus was never actually a person in being.90 The
Minnesota court rejected the defendant’s argument and overturned the
born-alive rule by declaring, “It seems too plain for argument that where
independent existence is possible and life is destroyed through a
wrongful act a cause of action arises[].”91
Since this holding, a majority of jurisdictions have legislatively
amended their wrongful death statutes, or courts have interpreted them,
to include viable fetuses.92 The viability standard corrects many of the
inherent flaws of the born-alive rule. For example, the viability standard
disregards the notion that a mother and her unborn child are one for the

South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin allow recovery for the wrongful
death of a child if the child was viable when the fatal injury was sustained).
89
Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838, 838 (Minn. 1949). In advancing this at-the-timeradical approach, the court reasoned,
Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a
period of gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus is
capable of independent and separate life, and that, though within the
body of the mother, it is not merely a part of her body, for her body
may die in all of its parts and the child remain alive, and capable of
maintaining life[]. If at that period a child so advanced is injured in its
limbs or members, and is born into the living world suffering from the
effects of the injury, is it not sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical
abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the
mother?
Id. at 840 (quoting Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 56 N.E. 638, 641 (Ill. 1900)). The Minnesota
Supreme Court reasoned that if the child could maintain a separate existence from its
mother, there was no reason to treat tortious injury inflicted upon it while still in gestation
as anything but an injury to the child. Id.
90
Id. at 839. Yet the court reversed this holding when viewing other aspects of
Minnesota law which conferred a legal identity upon a fetus. Id. at 840. The court
specifically held that the contrary treatment of the fetus in criminal and civil law in the
state was illogical and could not be maintained. Id.
91
Id. at 841. The court in Verkennes noted that for purposes of Minnesota criminal and
property law, a fetus was a person from the point of conception. Id. With this in mind, the
court had no problem holding a defendant liable, absent any precedent giving authority to
do so in negligence actions, because Minnesota law recognized a fetus as a person and no
individual should be able to escape invading the rights of another individual. Id.
92
Supra note 88 and accompanying text (identifying the thirty states that allow a fetal
wrongful death cause of action if the fetus is viable at the time the fatal injury occurs).
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purposes of the law until birth.93 The proposition that an unborn child is
part of its mother until birth has no scientific or medical basis.94
Furthermore, by allowing fetal wrongful death actions after the point of
viability, civil liability is not precluded by the death of a fetus like it
would be under the born-alive approach.95
Whereas the live-birth rule is criticized for drawing an arbitrary line
at birth, the viability approach is criticized for precluding recovery one
day before viability.96 Is it not true that parents are equally emotionally
harmed by the death of their unborn child one day before viability as
they are one day after viability?97 The viability standard also suffers a
See O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Mich. 1971). The Michigan Supreme Court,
disregarding the shattered reasoning for adhering to the born-alive rule, stated,
If the mother can die and the fetus live, or the fetus die and the
mother live, how can it be said that there is only one life?
If the tortious conduct can injure one and not the other, how can
it be said that there is not a duty owing to each?
The phenomenon of birth is not the beginning of life; it is merely
a change in the form of life.
Id. In advancing its reasoning further, the court spoke of a car accident in which a pregnant
mother was killed and her child was torn from her body and found to be alive several feet
away. Id. The court asked the rhetorical question of how many deaths would have taken
place if the child was found dead. Id. Finding that the application of the born alive rule to
this case would cause obvious problems, the court determined that medical advances have
now made the born alive rule obsolete. Id. See Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434, 439–40 (Miss.
1954), in which the Mississippi Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
[A]n unborn child, after it reaches the prenatal age of viability when
the destruction of the life of its mother does not necessarily mean the
end of its life also, and when, if separated from its mother would be so
far a matured human being that it would live and grow mentally and
physically, is a person; and if such child dies before birth as a result of
the negligent act of another, an action may be maintained for its death
under the wrongful death statute.
Id.
94
White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1969) (noting that although the proposition that
a mother and child are one entity until birth is advanced by jurisdictions who deny fetal
wrongful death causes of action, by 1969 multiple authorities had rejected this proposition
on medical and technological grounds).
95
Id. at 623–24. For justification, the court noted, “The death of a minor child is a deep
emotional wounding, and it may be admitted that there is a decided tendency for the law
to compensate for the grievous injury to family feelings involved in the death of such
children[.]” Id. at 623.
96
See O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Mo. 1983) (after the court criticized the
legislature for not keeping pace with modern understandings regarding fetal wrongful
death, the Missouri legislature went a step further and expanded the state’s wrongful death
statute to include parents of pre-viable fetuses).
97
Id. at 908; see Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(indicating that both parents of children born alive and parents of viable children have the
same interest at stake in fetal wrongful death actions, mainly the death of their child in
which they suffer the same loss).
93
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severe disadvantage vis-à-vis the burden of proof when compared to the
born-alive rule. The viability approach requires medical testimony to
prove that the child was viable and also that the prenatal injury lead to
the child’s death, whereas the born-alive rule requires only the latter.98
In the hypothetical in Part I, Ashley would have to prove first when
her child was conceived, and then use medical testimony to show her
child was viable and also that the accident was the proximate cause of
the unborn child’s death. Unfortunately, Ashley and David would most
likely be unsuccessful in a wrongful death action because their child was
approximately one week shy of the typical point of recognizing
viability.99
3.

Pre-Viability

If John struck Ashley’s SUV in Illinois, Ashley would have a cause of
action for the injuries she sustained, and additionally, the child would
have a cause of action through his or her estate for wrongful death.
Illinois is one of five states that allow parents to recover for the wrongful
death of their fetus at any stage of gestation.100 Under a pre-viability
approach to wrongful death, the estate of the wrongfully killed child has
a cause of action at any point past conception.101

98
Supra note 77 (noting that jurisdictions which follow the live birth rule differ on the
evidentiary standards required, and that some require the same medical proof as viability
jurisdictions). But see Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703 (stating that the same evidence—a clinical
autopsy—used to prove the wrongful death of a child that survives until birth is capable of
proving the cause of death of a fetus).
99
Supra note 87 (noting that viability occurs usually between twenty-three to twentyfour weeks into pregnancy).
100
Dina, supra note 74, at 259 (noting that currently, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, South
Dakota, and West Virginia extend wrongful death causes of action at any point during
gestation, whereas Georgia adheres to the ancient idea of legally recognizing a child at
quickening). See Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 65 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 1951), for a
discussion of the rationalization behind Georgia’s rule. The Tucker court concluded,
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is
able to stir in the mother's womb. An infant en ventre sa mere, or in
the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes.
It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate,
made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to
have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such
limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point the civil
law agrees with ours.
Id. at 910 (quotation omitted).
101
See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) (interpreting, for the
first time, South Dakota’s wrongful death statute that was specifically amended to include
a pre-viable fetus).
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Missouri law has utilized all three approaches to fetal wrongful
death at some point in the state’s history and has identified the
advantages and weaknesses of each approach.102 In 1913, Missouri
strictly applied the ideology that a mother and her child were one person
for purposes of the law, therefore not allowing any claim for an injury to
a fetus even if the fetus was subsequently born alive.103 The only cause
of action that existed for prenatal injuries was the injury to the mother,
which may or may not have existed.104 Forty years later, the Missouri
Supreme Court asked the question, “Why, then, may not a viable child
en ventre sa mere, injured through the negligence of another, maintain an
action in tort after birth, against the tort-feasor?”105 Acknowledging the
inequality caused by the denying recovery to expectant mothers,
Missouri reversed its earlier stance and allowed a viable child that was
injured in utero to maintain a wrongful death action if it was born
alive.106
Only thirty years later Missouri was again faced with the
inadequacies created by utilizing the born-alive approach, and as a
result, expanded the class of individuals protected under its wrongful

102
See MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000) (pre-viability cause of action); O’Grady v.
Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (viability cause of action); Steggal v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d
577 (Mo. 1953) (live birth cause of action); Buel v. United Railway Co., 154 S.W. 71 (Mo.
1913) (no fetal wrongful death cause of action)(viability cause of action).
103
See Buel, 154 S.W. at 73. In Buel, a fetus was gravely injured as a result of a railcar
opening its doors and throwing a pregnant woman to the ground. Id. at 72. Though badly
injured, the child survived and was born. Id. Six months later, the child died as a
proximate cause of the injury it sustained when his mother was thrown from the railway
car, yet the court concluded that any liability was precluded because the mother was the
only entity that could suffer an injury when it occurred. Id. at 73.
104
Id. at 72–73. The court found that, legally, the child was regarded as property of the
mother until it was born. Id. Therefore, having no legal identity, neither the child nor his
parents could maintain a cause of action for wrongful death because the child was mere
property until it was born. Id.
105
Steggal, 258 S.W.2d at 579 (emphasis added). The court in Steggal acknowledged that
the common law precluded any cause of action for prenatal injuries, even if the child was
born deformed due to those injuries. Id. Yet, after reviewing all of the reasons not to allow
recovery for fetal wrongful death and the lack of precedent, the court explained, “When
these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their mediaeval chain[,] the
proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.” Id. at 581 (quotation
omitted). Reasoning so, the court ignored the antiquated law and reasoning for denying a
child born alive any compensation for injuries she suffered before birth, and adopted the
born-alive rule. Id.
106
Id. at 582. In overturning the common law position Missouri had followed for many
years, the court determined, “It is no answer to say that there is no remedy because a cause
of action is not written down in the common law in precise formula. . . . Rather is it implicit
in the common law—else we admit that the law has no remedy for a grievous wrong.” Id.
at 579 (quoting Stemmer v. Kline, 26 A.2d 684, 686 (N.J. 1942)).
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death statute.107 In O’Grady v. Brown, the Missouri Supreme Court
sympathized with the parents’ argument that “the loss suffered by
parents of an unborn child is in every respect a substantial and genuine
loss, which is not distinguishable from the loss suffered when the child
dies shortly after birth. . . . To deny recovery based on the arbitrary
requirement of live birth would work an injustice[.]”108 The Missouri
legislature took up the cause to expand the scope of the state’s wrongful
death law shortly after the O’Grady decision.109 And in 1988, Missouri’s
new wrongful death statute was enacted which extended the cause of
action to all life after the point of conception.110
Examining Missouri’s law is a useful example for states desiring to
expand the class of individuals protected under fetal wrongful death
107
654 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Mo. 1983) (grappling with the issue of an expectant mother
whose child may have been killed due to the negligence of her obstetrician during an
emergency delivery).
108
654 S.W.2d at 908; see Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 702 (Ind. 2005) (stating
that parents whose viable child is negligently killed and parents whose child survives until
birth and dies from his injuries suffer the same emotional loss).
109
654 S.W.2d at 904. The defendant in the case argued that the legislature was content
with the existing law and it was not the court’s place to alter the legislature’s clear intent.
Id. at 911. The court expanded the statute to include pre-viable fetuses. Id. Although the
statute had not changed since the court’s last cases applying the viability rule, the court in
O’Grady found that when the legislature amended its wrongful death statute to include
emotional damages along with economic damages, the legislature intended to expand the
scope of individuals covered under the statute’s provisions. Id.
110
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000). The Missouri Statute reads, 1. The general
assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests
in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted
and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every
stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities
available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States, and decisional
interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court and
specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of
this state.
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child"
shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human
beings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of
biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of
action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by
failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular
program of prenatal care.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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statutes because it exemplifies the advantages and weaknesses of each
approach while also showing how the law can be changed either
through legislative or judicial initiative.111 Yet, Missouri case law also
highlights many of the main criticisms of including pre-viable children
in a wrongful death statute.112 First, there is speculation, especially
during the early stages of pregnancy, regarding whether a fetus will
survive and eventually be born alive.113 Furthermore, some argue that
parents who lose a child during the very early stages of pregnancy may
not suffer the same emotional harm as parents whose fetus is viable and
statistically has a greater chance of surviving until birth.114 Yet the previability rule avoids arbitrarily cutting off liability at birth or viability
because it is unknown whether the emotional harm suffered by parents
is any greater during the latter stages of a pregnancy.115 The pre-viability
rule acknowledges that an expectant mother does in fact suffer a loss
when her fetus is wrongfully killed at any point during gestation and
leaves the jury with the duty of quantifying the damage suffered.116
4.

Summary of the Three Approaches to Fetal Wrongful Death Actions

Although all three tests have their inherent advantages and
weaknesses, it is a state’s duty to determine which rule most adequately
reflects its citizens’ values. Most states have continued the trend of

111
Compare O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 904 (providing an example of judicially expanding the
class of individuals included in Missouri’s wrongful death statute), with MO. REV. STAT.
§1.205 (West 2000) (providing an example of legislatively expanding the class of
individuals).
112
Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Mo. 1990). The court in Rambo identified four
reasons for not extending the state’s wrongful death law to nonviable fetuses. Id. First,
there is always uncertainty whether a pregnancy will culminate in a live birth, especially
during the early stages. Id. Second, the mother can be compensated for her injuries
without extending the reach of the wrongful death statute. Id. Third, the father has an
action for the loss of the mother’s services. Id. Finally, fertile parents may conceive another
child. Id.
113
Id. The court in Rambo refused to extend liability to nonviable fetuses for multiple
reasons. Id. Foremost among its reasons was the fact that it is uncertain whether a
pregnancy will culminate in a live birth, and this speculation is greater during the early
portion of the term than the later portion. Id.
114
Id.; see also Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (arguing
that both sets of parents suffer the same harm when their child is negligently killed).
115
O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908 (finding that parents of unborn children suffer the same
emotional harm as parents of children who die shortly after death).
116
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703. Though it is difficult to prove damages for the loss of an
unborn child, parents still suffer emotional harm. Id. If a child is born alive and the
parents get to touch and see a child prior to its death, it is a valid consideration for the jury
in awarding damages. Id. However, simply because parents of unborn children do not get
to see their child does not mean they are not injured. Id.
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increasing the rights of the unborn in civil law, realizing the inherent
flaws created by the born-alive rule.117 The question, which has been
answered three different ways, is where the line should be drawn on
denying recovery in wrongful death; Justice Holmes guides us when
stating, “[We are not] troubled by the question where to draw the line.
That is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the
law.”118
D. Indiana’s Inclusion of the Unborn in Wrongful Death
The question of whether the parents of an unborn could be
compensated in wrongful death under Indiana law was seemingly a
rhetorical question throughout the state’s early legal history.119 Indiana’s
criminal and civil statutes in the early twentieth century did not confer a
legal identity to the unborn in most areas of the law.120 The Federal
District Court of Northern Indiana was the first court confronted with
the issue of whether Indiana would allow any tort recovery for negligent
killing of a fetus.121 The court answered a rhetorical no, determining that
Indiana law would not allow the parents of a stillborn child to recover
for wrongful death without citing any Indiana authority to back up its

See supra note 88 and accompanying text (identifying the thirty jurisdictions which
utilize a viability approach to fetal wrongful death).
118
Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925) (citation omitted). See Chrisafogeorgis v.
Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill. 1973), superseded by statute as stated in Miller v.
American Infertility Group of Ill., 2008 WL 4210537 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Sep 12, 2008) (NO. 1-053202). In debating whether liability should follow the death of an unborn child, the
defendant argued that lines have to be drawn in tort liability, and birth was the logical
point to start liability in fetal wrongful death causes of action. Id. Yet the court disagreed,
and found the more realistic and reasonable line to determine liability was at the point of
viability, when a child could independently survive without her mother. Id. Further, the
court found that when drawing dividing lines in the law, indefensible positions should be
avoided, such as denying recovery where independent life is medically proven to be
capable. Id.
119
Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 21 n.3 (Ind. 1971) (noting that the first cases which
challenged Indiana’s exclusion of the unborn from wrongful death were dismissed by the
federal court without citing any authority whatsoever). See Schulty v. Stecy, 11 Ind.Dec.
198 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
120
See cases cited supra note 23 (identifying jurisdictions which denied a legal identity to
an unborn child).
121
Britt, 277 N.E.2d at 21 (citing Schulty v. Stecy, 11 Ind.Dec. 198, 198 (N.D. Ind. 1967)).
In Schulty, the court denied a father recovery under Indiana’s wrongful death statute for
the loss of his unborn child. Id. The federal court did mention, however, that the mother
might be able to recover for her mental distress, raising interesting equal protection
arguments. Id.
117
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position.122 Indiana residents also did not find the challenge worth
pursuing until the first major case confronted the issue in 1972.123
By that time, twenty-four states were petitioned to expand their
wrongful death statutes to include the unborn; Britt v. Sears brought the
issue to the forefront in Indiana.124 Relying on Indiana’s adherence to the
common law born-alive rule, the lower court dismissed a father’s action
for the wrongful death of his viable unborn child.125 The sole question
presented on appeal was whether an action may be maintained by a
father for the wrongful death of a fetus alleged to be a full-term healthy
male capable of independent life.126 The Indiana wrongful death statute
at the time allowed recovery by a parent for the wrongful death of a
child caused by another’s negligence, yet was silent as to whether the
unborn was included in the term “child[.]”127 Acknowledging that this
was a question of first impression in Indiana, the Court of Appeals
looked to different jurisdictions and other sections of Indiana law for
guidance, ultimately concluding that a viable child would be included in
the term child for purposes of wrongful death recovery.128 Following the
majority of states who had confronted the question, Indiana disregarded
122
Id. at 21 (citing Schulty, 11 Ind.Dec. at 198) (the Schulty court was the first court to
determine the issue of fetal wrongful death in Indiana, yet the Indiana Appellate Court
disregarded this case when it ruled on the issue for the first time in 1972).
123
Id. at 20. The wrongful act of the defendant in Schulty resulted in the death of a man’s
wife and unborn child. Id. at 21. The trial court allowed the father to maintain his
wrongful death claim for the loss of his wife, yet dismissed his wrongful death claim for his
nine month and one-week-developed unborn child because the common law believed the
child was part of the mother until birth. Id.
124
Id. at 22 (out of the twenty–four states that had confronted the question of allowing
wrongful death recovery for unborn children, sixteen of those states and the District of
Columbia allowed recovery).
125
Id. There is surprisingly little literature on the issue of whether a father can maintain a
wrongful death claim for the loss of a child that is not yet born. Id. at 21–23. The damages
suffered by the father are believed to be less substantial than those suffered by the mother.
Id. at 28. “The action of the father for the wrongful death of a child is based solely on the
loss of the father’s property right in the fruits of the child’s services.” Id. at 28 (citation
omitted).
126
Id. at 21. The court was confronted with a difficult question, whether a father could
maintain a cause of action for the wrongful death of his unborn child. Id. The Schulty court
stated that a father could not maintain a cause of action while the mother might be able to
do so. Id. This court found that at least superficially, denying a father the right to maintain
a cause of action would violate the United States Supreme Court decisions under the Equal
Protection Clause with respect to illegitimate children. Id. at 24.
127
IND. CODE § 34-1-1-8 (1986) (amended 1987) (repealed 1998) (in pertinent part the 1986
version of the wrongful death statute stated that a father may bring a claim for the death of
a child).
128
Britt, 277 N.E.2d at 25–26 (stating that Indiana law has allowed unborn children to
maintain claims in property law and inheritance rights and has specifically recognized the
unborn infant as a child in abortion and burial statutes).
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the antiquated born-alive rule in favor of compensating parents of viable
fetuses for their loss.129
Out of equity, the Indiana appellate court held that a viable fetus is
to be considered a child within the meaning of the previous version of
our wrongful death statute.130 The court concluded that the legislature
had not considered the concept of including the unborn under the
wrongful death statute when it created the statute in 1881, yet after
reviewing the history behind the statute, the court also concluded that
the legislature would have intended for the unborn to be included in the
wrongful death statute had the issue been presented.131 Although
Indiana adopted the viability rule in compensating survivors in
wrongful death, the law was still inadequate to fully compensate parents
for their lost child.132 In 1987, Miller v. Mayberry highlighted the
weaknesses in Indiana’s wrongful death statute, primarily insofar as the
statute had no bite when dealing with unborn or young children because
the statute allowed recovery for only pecuniary losses, which did not
include any compensation for emotional harm.133 Shortly after the Miller
129
Jill D. Washburn Helbling, To Recover or not to Recover: A State by State Survey of Fetal
Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363, 393 (1996) (identifying Indiana among the states
that allow parents of a viable fetus to maintain a fetal wrongful death cause of action); see
Britt, 277 N.E.2d at 27 (stating that a full-term, healthy male is a person for purposes of
Indiana’s wrongful death statute).
130
Britt, 277 N.E.2d at 27. The court weighed the pros and cons of including an unborn
child in the wrongful death statute and determined that it was just and logical to treat a
viable fetus as a person for purposes of the wrongful death statute. Id. at 26. Though the
court professed that it did not know the answer of whether the child would survive outside
of its mother’s body in this particular case, the court found that most children who reach
the late stages of gestation are usually born and that was sufficient evidence to warrant
finding the fetus a person. Id.
131
Id. at 24–25 (because the legislature had probably not considered the issue, the court
applied its own meaning to the term child rather than attempting to figure out what
definition the legislature would have given the term when the statute was originally
passed).
132
Miller v. Mayberry, 506 N.E.2d 7, 11 (Ind. 1987). The plaintiff’s seventeen-month-old
son was struck by a car and quickly rushed to a hospital. Id. at 8. The doctor released the
child after taking an X-ray, but the child died the next morning because the doctor failed to
recognize major internal injuries. Id. The court awarded the plaintiff a substantial sum, yet
this was reversed on appeal because the parents where not allowed to recover for
emotional damages. Id. Although the court expressed its desire to compensate the
plaintiff, it was bound to uphold the law and not interfere with the duties of the legislature
to make the law. Id. at 11.
133
Id. at 11. In accepting its inability to change the law, the court explained,
[This Court is bound to enforce the intention of the Legislature. It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that the failure of the
Legislature to change a statute after a line of decisions of a court of last
resort giving the statute a certain construction, amounts to an
acquiescence by the Legislature in the construction given by the court,
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court denied parents full recovery for their loss, the Indiana legislature
amended the wrongful death statute for the first time, fifteen years after
Indiana began applying the viability rule.134 These amendments were
important for the following two reasons: (1) the legislature added
language to define the term “child” in the amended statute, and (2) the
legislature alleviated the deficiencies exemplified in Miller by specifically
allowing recovery for lost love and affection.135 After these amendments,
Indiana continued to follow the viability approach to fetal wrongful
death, although parents could be compensated only for the emotional
trauma they suffered from losing a child before birth.136
For thirty years, parents in Indiana were compensated for the death
of their viable, unborn child; however, this changed in 2002 when the
Indiana Supreme Court decided Bolin v. Wingert.137 Before the Bolin
decision, the Indiana legislature had passed a new wrongful death
statute pertaining solely to children with language that is nearly

and that such construction should not then be disregarded or lightly
treated.
Id. (citations omitted). The court wanted to change the interpretation of the statute to
include emotional damages, but at the same time, it recognized that separation of powers
prohibited the court from exercising its desires. Id. Justice Shepard’s dissent raises an
interesting question: if a court is responsible for interpreting a statute or phrase a certain
way, is it the court’s duty or the legislature’s duty to change that interpretation when it
becomes necessary to do so? Id. at 12.
134
1987 Ind. Acts 306. The amendments added the following language to IND. CODE
section 34-1-1-8(a), (e) (1986) (amended 1987) (repealed 1998) to describe the term child:
(a) As used in this section, “child” means an unmarried individual
without dependents who is:
(1) Less than twenty (20) years of age; or
(2) Less than twenty-three (23) years of age and is enrolled in an
institution of higher education or in a vocational school or program.
...
(e) In an action to recover for the death of a child, the plaintiff may
recover damages:
(1) for the loss of the child’s services;
(2) for the loss of the child’s love and companionship;.
Id.
135
Id.; see O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (finding that because the
legislature had expanded compensation to cover emotional damages, the legislature
intended to expand the group of individuals covered by the wrongful death statute).
136
Miller, 506 N.E.2d at 11. See generally Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (identifying that after the wrongful death statute was amended, the viability
rule was still used for fifteen years until the Indiana Supreme Court overturned the holding
of Bolin v. Wingert).
137
764 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 2001); see Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 696 (stating that until 2002,
tortfeasors had no legitimate expectation of immunity from a wrongful death of a viable
fetus cause of action, therefore overruling the born-alive rule would do no harm).
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verbatim with the 1987 version of the statute.138 The new statute
contained the same four concepts to define the term “child”: (1) an
unmarried, (2) individual, (3) without dependents, (4) who is less than
twenty years of age.139 The version of the wrongful death statute the
court applied in Britt did not contain the language defining the term
“child” added by the 1987 amendment, which was the deciding factor
for the court in Bolin.140
In Bolin, an automobile accident resulted in the death of the
plaintiff’s eight- to ten-week old fetus, and the parents believed the
Indiana Supreme Court might follow its neighboring states in expanding
wrongful death to the pre-viable stages of pregnancy.141 Noting that an
action for wrongful death is entirely a creature of statute, the Indiana
Supreme Court for the first time was confronted with the new version of
the statute—albeit nearly identical to the previous version.142 Even
though the viability approach was applied for fifteen years after the
language defining the term “child” was added to the statute, the Indiana
Supreme Court concluded that the language was added to deny parents
of children not yet born any compensation in wrongful death actions.143
Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the state

138
See supra note 18 (providing the text of the Indiana Wrongful Death or Injury of a
Child statute).
139
Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 206. But see Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 697-98. The Horn court gave a
completely different interpretation to the defining language than the court did in Bolin. Id.
While Bolin found the defining language was created to limit the scope of recovery, Horn
found the language was meant to expand the scope of recovery. Id. at 698.
140
Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 201, 205–06. The court in Bolin found that the first three defining
concepts tended to indicate that only living children would be covered by the statute. Id. at
206. Being married or having dependents are activities engaged in by living individuals—
not fetuses. Id. Therefore, the court found it would be an illogical interpretation of the
language to find the legislature intended to include unborn children in the statute. Id.
141
Id. at 203. The parents in this case realized that Indiana had long followed the
viability approach, yet hoped Indiana would expand fetal wrongful death causes of action
to parents of pre-viable children. Id. Bolin was eight to ten weeks pregnant at the time the
accident happened. Id.
142
Id. at 206. The key language added by the 1987 amendment had not changed in any
material way since the new statute was enacted. Id. The new statute passed in 1998
contained the same language defining the term “child” and also contained the clause
allowing recovery for lost love, affection, and companionship when calculating damages.
Id. See Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 697 (considering the same language, yet reaching a different
result).
143
Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 206. The Indiana Supreme Court found that the wrongful death
statute was susceptible to multiple meanings and therefore was forced to “try to ascertain
the legislature’s intent and interpret the statute so as to effectuate that intent.” Id. at 204
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that the intent of adding the language
defining “child” was that the legislature did not contemplate an unborn child within the
meaning of the statute. Id. at 207.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 7

1242 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

legislature intended to reverse three decades of case law utilizing the
viability rule in favor of the more restrictive born-alive rule.144
Since 2002, the Bolin decision has categorically precluded parents
from bringing a wrongful death claim for the death of their unborn
child.145 In 2005, the Indiana Court of Appeals in Horn v. Henderson
directly confronted the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Bolin.146
First, the case questioned the interpretation that the Indiana Supreme
Court had given to the term “child.”147 Second, the appellate court
indicated that denying parents of viable unborn children compensation,
while allowing parents of children born alive to recover for their losses,
violates Indiana’s Equal Privileges Clause.148 Finally, the case raises
multiple other concerns regarding Bolin’s effects on Indiana law as a
whole.149 The appellate court was compelled to point out the flaws
created by Bolin, yet could offer no remedy to the parents because the
144
See id. at 201. The result of the ruling was that the mother was allowed to be
compensated for her injuries, which where negligible, because her vehicle was rear-ended.
Id. at 208. The father was completely denied any form of compensation because he suffered
no physical injury from the car accident. Id. Therefore, emotional harm occasioned from
the loss of an unborn child was no longer remedied under Indiana law. Id. See also McVey
v. Sargent, 855 N.E.2d 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). But see Horn, 834 N.E.2d at 690 (allowing
recovery in wrongful death for the negligent killing of an unborn child).
145
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 694. The court in Horn wrote to attempt to persuade the Indiana
Supreme Court to overrule its holding in Bolin which denied recovery to parents when
viable fetuses are negligently killed. Id. at 695. The court concluded, “[F]or more than
thirty years, form 1971 until Bolin was decided in 2002, tortfeasors had no legitimate
expectation of immunity from a wrongful death cause of action for the prenatal death of a
viable fetus.” Id.
146
Id. at 693.
147
Id. at 697–701 (challenging the Bolin opinion, stating that the 1987 amendment should
convey a different message than the one given by the Supreme Court—that the term
“child” is defined incorrectly because the Supreme Court did not apply canons of
construction—and that the term “child” is given a different meaning if read in relation to
Indiana’s two other wrongful death statutes).
148
Id. at 701–03. A two-part test has been applied to challenges of Indiana’s Equal
Privileges and Immunities clause. Id. at 701–02. “First, the disparate treatment accorded
by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish
the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly
applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.” Id. (quoting Collins v.
Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994)). The Horn court rejected the notion that parents who
give birth to a child are inherently different from parents who do not give birth to a child
for purposes of the wrongful death statute because they could not “discern [any] legitimate
explanation for such disparate treatment[.]” Id. at 703.
149
Id. at 690 (questioning the court’s opinion in Bolin because it doubts that the
legislature intended to impose criminal sanctions for the same wrongful act that that now
carries no civil responsibilities; doubts that the legislature intended to overturn thirty years
of case law without specifically mentioning it; and finally doubts that the legislature
intended to leave parents of unborn children without an adequate remedy when these
unborn children are wrongfully killed); see Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 201.
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appellate court lacked the authority to overturn Indiana Supreme Court
decisions.150
McVey v. Sargent is the most recent case challenging the Indiana
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the child wrongful death statute.151
The appellant challenged the validity of the born-alive rule under
Indiana’s Equal Privileges Clause and also under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.152 The court concluded that
there were inherent differences between children born alive and children
that die before birth, and therefore dismissed the appellant’s claim
because her child was not born alive.153
In sum, although Indiana abandoned the born-alive rule for thirty
years, as have thirty-five other states, the Indiana Supreme Court has
nevertheless determined that the current approach to fetal wrongful
death should be the born-alive rule.154 Though the holding in Bolin has
been challenged by the Indiana Court of Appeals and legal scholars, the
Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana legislature have been unwilling
to address the inadequacies inherent in the born-alive rule.155

150
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 704 (highlighting the injustice, the court told the plaintiff that her
only hope of obtaining a remedy for the death of her child was for the Supreme Court to
accept transfer and overrule its earlier interpretation of the child wrongful death statute or
for the legislature to repudiate Bolin).
151
855 N.E.2d 324, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (in which a father of an unborn child
challenged the Bolin holding when his pregnant wife and unborn child were killed in an
automobile accident).
152
Id. at 327 (the appellant got the idea to challenge the child wrongful death statute from
the Horn court’s opinion, in which the court expressed its desire to overturn the Indiana
Supreme Court’s interpretation but also acknowledged that it lacked the authority to do
so).
153
Id. at 328. “[T]he 'law is replete with examples of how children and viable fetuses are
dealt with differently,' and . . . 'Indiana law predominantly utilizes the date of birth, not the
date of viability, to establish a determination of eligibility' for various rights, activities, and
occupations.” Id. at n.4 (citation omitted). The appellate court concluded,
The state has an interest in determining that there is a specific
point at which parents may bring an action to recover for the death of
a child caused by another’s negligence. As Bolin acknowledged, the
lack thereof is ‘otherwise open-ended liability.’ The fact that the
legislature set that point at the time of a live birth is rationally related
to its legitimate interest in having such a time defined for its citizenry
so that they might then pursue the action authorized by the statute.
Id. at 329 (citation omitted).
154
See supra notes 74, 88 (identifying the states that follow the born-alive and viability
approaches).
155
See Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 693 (declaring, “[O]ur supreme court’s words and opinions are
not carved in stone, and it is not inappropriate for the parties or the judges of this court to
ask the court to reconsider earlier opinions[]”); Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 206 (stating that the
Indiana Supreme Court is bound to follow the legislature’s intent).
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III. ANALYSIS
For three decades, Indiana has provided parents of viable unborn
children compensation for their losses under the theory of wrongful
death, yet it took but one court decision to reverse the state’s practice.156
With that holding, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the term
“child” in the wrongful death statute did not include unborn children,
regardless of the fact that the same statute had provided compensation
to parents for the wrongful death of their viable, unborn child for fifteen
years.157 The question arising from this controversial holding is whether
the Indiana Supreme Court correctly interpreted the legislature’s intent
when it found that the emotional trauma parents suffer from the
wrongful death of a viable, unborn child was not intended to be a
compensable injury.158
Part III.A analyzes the Bolin court’s interpretation of Indiana’s
Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child Statute, focusing on how the
Indiana Supreme Court misconstrued the legislature’s intent when
interpreting the meaning of the term “child” within the statute.159 Next,
Part III.B proposes that the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
child wrongful death statute violates Indiana’s Equal Privileges Clause
found in the state’s constitution.160 Finally, Part III.C identifies reasons
why following the common law born-alive rule is unjust and inequitable
in contemporary society.161

156
Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 207 (after following the viability approach to fetal wrongful death
since 1972, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded “that the legislature intended that only
children born alive fall under Indiana’s Child Wrongful Death Statute[]”).
157
Supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (though the child wrongful death statute
remained the same after the 1987 amendments, the Indiana Supreme Court interpreted the
statute in a more restrictive manner than previous courts had done).
158
Supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (listing the discrepancies between the
Indiana Court of Appeals’ and the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the child
wrongful death statute).
159
See infra Part III.A (discussing the multiple reasons why the legislature believed it was
including unborn viable children within the term “child” under the child wrongful death
statute).
160
See infra Part III.B (explaining why there are no inherent differences between parents
of children that die shortly before birth and parents of children that die shortly after birth,
or at least no differences that justify different treatment under the Indiana Constitution).
161
See infra Part III.C (addressing the multiple reasons why the born-alive rule creates
injustices for parents of unborn children that die due to the wrongful acts of another and
how other methods of determining what constitutes a person or child for wrongful death
statutes corrects this problem).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/7

Curtis: Including Victims Without a Voice: Amending Indiana's Child Wrong

2009]

Indiana’s Child Wrongful Death Statute

1245

A. The Indiana Supreme Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Indiana Wrongful
Death or Injury of a Child Statute
From 1972 until the Bolin decision in 2002, Indiana law dictated that
parents of unborn, viable children could maintain a cause of action for
wrongful death if their child was negligently killed.162 In 1987, the
Indiana legislature significantly amended the child wrongful death
statute to include the current definition of the term “child.”163 Although
the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the legislature intended not
to include unborn children under the statute’s provisions, from 1987
until 2002, this same statute, or nearly identical versions of it, did offer
relief to parents of viable, unborn children.164 When the legislature
amended the wrongful death statute in 1987 and in 1998, it is assumed
that it was aware of the current state of the law and took this into
consideration when placing the term “child” into the statute.165
This Note contends that the Indiana Supreme Court interpreted the
Indiana Wrongful Death or Injury to a Child Statute incorrectly when it
overturned well-established law in the state of Indiana, allowing
recovery for viable fetuses under wrongful death.166 First, when the
child wrongful death statute is read in relation with Indiana’s other
wrongful death statutes, it shows that the language defining the term
“child” was meant as an upper limit to recover under the statute—not a
lower limit.167 Next, once it is established that the legislature intended
See supra note 144 and accompanying text. See also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 695 (“[F]or
more than thirty years, from 1971 until Bolin was decided in 2002, tortfeasors had no
legitimate expectation of immunity from a wrongful death cause of action for the prenatal
death of a viable fetus.”).
163
See supra note 134 (supplying the text of the 1987 amendments to the Wrongful Death
or Injury of a Child statute).
164
See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (discussing the Indiana Supreme
Court’s decision to overturn thirty years of law based on amendments which were passed
to expand the reach of the Wrongful Death or Injury to a Child statute); see O’Grady v.
Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (the Missouri Supreme Court was faced with similar
language which expanded the damages recoverable under its state’s child wrongful death
statute, and the court determined the legislature would do this only if it intended to
expand the class of individuals protected under the statute).
165
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 698. “[W]e must assume that legislature is mindful of both court
decisions and existing law.” Id. (citing Burke v. Town of Schereville, 739 N.E.2d 1086, 1092
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).
166
See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text (explaining the Indiana Court of
Appeals’ disagreement with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201
(Ind. 2002)).
167
See infra notes 170–75 (explaining that the language defining the term “child” in the
child wrongful death statute is meant to create an upper limit to recovery). See also Bolin,
764 N.E.2d at 205. Even the court in Bolin acknowledged the possibility that the legislature
was simply attempting to differentiate the child and adult wrongful death statutes by
162
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the language defining the term “child” to set an upper limit on claims,
further evidence will show that the legislature intended to continue
applying the viability rule.168 Specifically, the Indiana Supreme Court
interpreted "child" incorrectly when it misconstrued the legislature’s
intent in passing the 1987 amendments, mistakenly read requirements
into the child wrongful death statute that are not found in the language
of the statute, and created inconsistencies in Indiana law where the
unborn are protected in some instances but not others.169
1.

The Indiana Supreme Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Wrongful
Death Statute

To begin, when the Indiana Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child
Statute is read in connection with Indiana’s other two wrongful death
statutes, it becomes clear that the enumeration of factors describing the
term “child” is used to create an upper limit to avoid redundant statutes
or multiple causes of action.170 A well-established rule of statutory
construction provides that when construing the meaning of a particular
statute, related statutes are in pari materia and should be considered
when interpreting the meaning of a particular statute and to effectuate
the legislative intent.171 When statutes address the same subject, the
court should attempt to harmonize the statutes if possible.172 When the
Indiana Supreme Court viewed the four factors defining the term “child”
in the wrongful death statute as an unmarried individual without
placing defining language in the child wrongful death statute when stating, “While the
legislature has clearly set upper limits on the definition of ‘child,’ it is not as plain that it
has placed a ‘lower’ limit on the definition of ‘child.’” Id. at 205.
168
See infra notes 179–91 and accompanying text (discussing how the Indiana Supreme
Court misconstrued the meaning of the 1984 amendments to the child wrongful death
statute).
169
See supra note 41 (showing that killing a viable fetus is punishable as feticide in
Indiana); see also Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 25 (Ind. App. 1971) (noting that the unborn
are protected under Indiana’s abortion, homicide, property and inheritance laws).
170
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 699 (holding that the purpose of adding the defining language to
the child wrongful death statute was to distinguish child wrongful death claims from
claims under the general wrongful death statute).
171
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining the differences between the
Indiana Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the child wrongful death statute in Horn v.
Hendrickson and the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same statute); see also
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 698 (defining pari materia as “a cannon of construction that statutes that
are in pari materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be
resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject[]”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 53, at 807.
172
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining the Indiana Court of Appeals’
interpretation of the child wrongful death statute in Horn v. Hendrickson); see also Horn, 824
N.E.2d at 698.
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dependants who is under the age of twenty, it concluded that the
legislature contemplated that only living children fall within the
definition of the term.173
When the four factors added to define the term “child”((1)
unmarried, (2) individual, (3) without dependants, and (4) who is less
then twenty years of age) are viewed in relation with the three factors
that define the term “adult person” in the adult wrongful death statute
((1) an unmarried individual, (2) who does not have dependants, and (3)
is not a child under IND. CODE section 34-32-2-1), it starts to become clear
that the statutes were written to correlate with one another.174 The
current child wrongful death statute was codified in 1998, while the
adult wrongful death statute was codified in 1999, adopting the
language of the child wrongful death statute for the purpose of avoiding
the redundancy of having statutes that create duplicate causes of action
for the same death.175
The purpose of wrongful death statutes is to compensate the
survivors for not only lost pecuniary value of the individual, but also for
emotional losses such as love and affection.176 The logical reason the
legislature would create an upper limit for the term “child” in the statute
is to preclude parents whose connection with an older child may be too
tenuous to support a claim for lost love and affection.177 To this end, the
legislature placed the language defining the term “child” in the statute to
preclude parents of a child who is over the age of twenty-three, married,
or has dependents of their own from collecting for emotional damages
See supra notes 137–44 and accompanying text (explaining the approach the Supreme
Court followed when overturning the state of Indiana’a viability approach). See also Bolin,
764 N.E.2d at 206 (overturning the use of the viability rule in child wrongful death cases in
favor of the born-alive rule).
174
See supra note 18 (providing the text of Indiana’s Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child
statute). See IND. CODE § 34-23-1-2 (2008) (defining an adult as an unmarried individual
who: (1) does not have any dependents and (2) who is not a child under the child wrongful
death statute).
175
IND. Code § 34-23-1-2 (2008) (since the general wrongful death statute was passed only
one year after the child wrongful death statute was amended, it is reasonable to infer that
the statutes were constructed using similar language to differentiate the statutes).
176
See supra notes 60–62, 134 and accompanying text (in 1987, the legislature specifically
amended the child wrongful death statute to compensate parents of unborn or young
children for lost love, companionship, and affection because it was too speculative to prove
the child’s future earnings potential); see also O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 911 (Mo.
1983) (showing that the Missouri Supreme Court inferred that the state legislature intended
to expand the reach of its wrongful death statute when it expanded damages to include
emotional harm).
177
See supra notes 60, 112, 115–16 (providing examples where the court has denied
wrongful death compensation where the harm was too speculative to quantify). See also
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 699 (finding that the language added to the wrongful death statute
created an upper limit for recovery, not a lower limit).
173
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that may either not exist or are too speculative to quantify, rather than to
preclude parents of viable children from recovering in wrongful death.178
Next, along with failing to read the child wrongful death statute in
correlation with the adult wrongful death statute, the Indiana Supreme
Court misconstrued the legislature’s intent when it amended the child
wrongful death statute in 1987.179 To begin, Bolin was the first case in
which the Indiana Supreme Court was asked to interpret the Wrongful
Death or Injury of a Child Statute.180 When Britt was decided in 1972, the
Indiana Court of Appeals was confronted with an older version of the
statute which simply allowed recovery for the death of a child.181 The
appellate court defined “child” in the statute to include “a full term
healthy male capable of independent life,” therefore extending wrongful
death recovery to viable, unborn children.182 Fifteen years after the Britt
decision, the Indiana legislature amended the wrongful death statute in
two key ways in 1987.183 First, in response to the Miller decision which
reaffirmed Indiana’s tradition of awarding only pecuniary losses, the
legislature made emergency amendments to the child wrongful death
statute to allow recovery for not only pecuniary losses but also emotional
damages including the loss of a child’s love and affection.184 Second, the
178
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 699. The purpose of placing the defining language in the child
wrongful death statute was to ensure that a parent had a substantial and ongoing
relationship with an older child before he or she could recover in wrongful death. Id.
Apparently, the legislature determined that when a child marries, has a child of his or her
own, or graduates from college, the parents’ emotional attachment is too speculative to
justify an award under wrongful death. Id.
179
See supra text accompanying notes 136–37 (showing that Indiana followed the viability
approach for fifteen years after the wrongful death statute was amended until the Supreme
Court rejected this approach).
180
Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 205–06 (Ind. 2002). The earlier rulings on the statute
were made by the Court of Appeals; therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court approached it as
a case of first impression. Id. at 203. Though the Supreme Court acknowledged that there
was an absence of clear legislative guidance, it concluded that the Indiana legislature
intended to exclude unborn children from the statute. Id. at 207.
181
See supra note 127 (discussing that the older version of the statute did not contain the
descriptive language defining the term “child,” making it possible for the Bolin court to
answer the question of first impression by looking to other decisions and judicial opinions
in similar jurisdictions to settle the controversy).
182
See supra note 129 and accompanying text (identifying Indiana’s former position of
following the viability rule for purposes of fetal wrongful death recovery); see also Britt v.
Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Ind. App. 1971) (defining a child for purposes of the statute as a
“full term healthy male capable of independent life”).
183
See supra note 129 and accompanying text (identifying Indiana’s former position of
following the viability rule for purposes of fetal wrongful death recovery); see also Britt, 277
N.E.2d at 21.
184
See supra note 133 (in response to Miller, the legislature found it necessary to allow
recovery for emotional damages suffered by parents and “declared an emergency” which
provided that the amendments take immediate effect). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-8
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amendment added the current definition of “child” found in the state’s
child wrongful death statute.185
By expanding the scope of allowable compensable damages under
wrongful death actions, it seems that the legislature was not only
stamping their approval on the viability rule practiced at the time, but
was also expanding the reach of the law beyond where Indiana law had
reached in the past.186 When the wrongful death statute was amended in
1987, the legislature was aware of both existing law and court decisions
interpreting those laws.187 Given that Britt and its viability rule were
established law in 1987 when the statute was amended, if the legislature
had intended to exclude viable children from the definition of the term
“child,” it would have clearly expressed its intention to nullify Britt
when it amended the statute.188 Instead, the legislature expanded the
damages recoverable under the statute without placing any specific
language about excluding expectant parents in the amendment, or even
attempting to correct the courts, as they continued to apply the viability
rule for another fifteen years.189 Indeed, “[i]t is a fundamental rule of
statutory construction that the failure of the Legislature to change a
statute after a line of decisions of a court of last resort giving the statute a
certain construction, amounts to an acquiescence by the legislature in the
construction given by the court, and that such construction should not

note (West 1987) (repealed 1998) (after Miller, the wrongful death statute was amended to
encompass a wide array of damages).
185
See supra note 134 (giving the language of the amendments to Indiana’s Wrongful
Death or Injury of the Child statute).
186
See supra text accompanying notes 132–36 (identifying the reasons for the legislature’s
amendment of the child wrongful death statute in 1984).
187
Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); see O’Grady v. Brown,
654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983) (interpreting the meaning of the terms “person[,]” “minor
child[,]” and “child” to include viable fetuses because that is in line with the remedial
purpose of a wrongful death statute and in accord with a large number of jurisdictions
which have held similarly).
188
Id. at 698 (assessing the legislature’s intent for making the 1987 amendments to the
child wrongful death statute, it stated, “[R]ecovery under the statute beyond the pecuniary
loss rule and [by the legislature] defin[ing] ‘child,’ the statute unmistakably superseded
Miller, but did not likewise repudiate our holding in Britt that an unborn child capable of
life outside the womb is a ‘child.’”). Id.
189
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 697. See O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 909. The court identified three
purposes of a wrongful death statute: to provide compensation to plaintiffs for the loss of
the loved ones; to ensure that tortfeasors are held responsible for their actions; and to
generally deter conduct that could result in death. Id. The court found that these general
reasons for enacting a wrongful death statute apply equally whether the deceased is born
or unborn. Id. Parents have a general right to be protected against, and compensated for,
the loss of the child they wished to have. Id.
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then be disregarded or lightly treated.”190 It would surely be a strange
interpretation of the legislature’s intent if the amended statute was read
to significantly expand the scope of damages being awarded to expectant
parents who lost their child, while at the same time drastically limiting
the class of individuals who could bring a claim.191
Furthermore, when interpreting statutes, courts should interpret
words in their plain, or ordinary and usual sense.192 The American
Heritage dictionary’s definition of “child” includes an unborn infant or
fetus.193 The appellate court in Britt determined the term “child” found
in the wrongful death statute included viable, unborn children.194 The
Indiana Supreme Court in Bolin, however, reached an opposite
conclusion when it viewed the language defining child and concluded
that the legislature intended for only living individuals to be included
under the statute’s provisions.195 Yet, if the Indiana Supreme Court
viewed the language defining “child” as solely an upper limit on
recovery and acknowledged the fact that the term “child” has included
viable fetuses since 1972 without the legislature challenging this
interpretation, a different conclusion might have been reached in Bolin.196
190
Miller v. Maybury, 506 N.E.2d 7, 11 (Ind. 1987) (citations omitted); see Steggall v.
Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Mo. 1953) (finding that since the legislature had not acted to
stop different areas of the state’s law from conferring a legal identity to the unborn, the
legislature had accepted that a “person” for purposes of Missouri law included a viable
fetus).
191
Horn, 824 N.E. at 701. The appellate court found the Indiana Supreme Court missed
the legislature’s intent:
The holding in Bolin that parents in Indiana cannot recover for the
wrongful death of a viable fetus is a return to the 19th century when,
in tort law, a fetus and its mother were considered one and the same.
We do not believe that the Indiana legislature intended to turn the
clock back a century when it modified the child wrongful death statute
in 1987.
Id.
192
IND. CODE § 1-1-4-1(1) (2004); see supra note 197 (noting the Indiana Court of Appeals’
criticism of the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the child wrongful death
statute).
193
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 332 (3d ed. 1992).
194
See supra note 128 and accompanying text (acknowledging that Indiana law recognizes
a fetus for purposes of its criminal and probate laws).
195
See supra note 143 and accompanying text (explaining the Indiana Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the 1984 amendment to Indiana’s Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child
statute).
196
See supra text accompanying note 154 (stating how the Indiana Supreme Court
changed Indiana’s approach to fetal wrongful death, even though Indiana and multiple
other states utilized the viability approach for many years); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 701
(the court recommended that the appellant seek transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, and
encouraged the Indiana Supreme Court to reconsider its interpretation of the child
wrongful death statute).
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The Indiana Supreme Court Wrongfully Added the Born-Alive
Requirement

Along with changing the definition of the term “child,” the Indiana
Supreme Court also replaced the rule of wrongful death recovery at
viability with the born-alive rule.197 The Indiana Supreme Court has
stated that nothing may be read into a statute that is not the manifest
intent of the legislature as ascertained from the plain language of the
statute.198 It is difficult to assume that the Indiana legislature intended to
significantly expand damages recoverable under the child wrongful
death statute while simultaneously denying recovery to the class of
individuals to which the damages would most apply.199 Furthermore, if
the Indiana legislature intended to exclude unborn children from the
statute when it made the amendments in 1987, it would have precluded
the courts from continuing to utilize the viability approach after 1998
when it amended the statute once again.200 Instead, the legislature was
silent as to the courts’ continued adherence to the viability rule, therefore
accepting this approach rather than, as the Indiana Supreme Court held,
proposing a new rule, which is not found in the text of the statute or in
court opinions during this time period.201
3.

The Interpretation of the Wrongful Death Statute Contradicts Other
Laws

Finally, by failing to include unborn children under Indiana’s child
wrongful death statute, the Indiana Supreme Court is contradicting other
state laws that specifically protect unborn children.202 Under Indiana

197
See supra text accompanying note 144 (showing the effects of the born alive approach
on fetal wrongful death cases); see also Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 207 (explaining why the Indiana
Supreme Court found the born-alive rule was the legislature’s intended test for wrongful
death claims).
198
Indiana Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 943, 946
(Ind. 1999); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 699 (stating that requirements, such as a rule of law,
are not usually read into statutes).
199
See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text (noting what the amendments were
and how they subsequently affected Indiana law); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 698 (bringing
attention to the fact that for fifteen years after the wrongful death statute was amended, the
viability rule was still the accepted approach in the state).
200
See supra note 142 (stating that the legislature amended the wrongful death statute
fifteen years after the viability rule was judicially enforced, and the legislature did not alter
this holding in any way).
201
See supra note 174 (stating the language of child and adult wrongful death statutes).
202
See supra note 149 and accompanying text (identifying the Indiana Court of Appeals’
problems with the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the child wrongful death
statute).
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law, knowingly or intentionally killing a viable fetus is murder and
punishable by the death sentence.203 Similarly, an individual who
unintentionally kills a viable fetus when acting in a reckless manner can
be charged with feticide.204 Yet, this same individual who could be
charged with feticide for his reckless actions owes no civil duty to the
same woman under the current interpretation of Indiana’s child
wrongful death statute.205 This outcome is an anomaly under Indiana
law and creates incongruous results.206 Assuming the legislature is
aware of the implications and impact a proposed statute will have on the
state’s law, it is doubtful the legislature meant for an individual who
unintentionally kills an unborn child, in a car accident for example, to be
punished criminally yet owe no civil duty to the parents who suffer the
injury for their loss.207
B. The Indiana Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Indiana’s Child Wrongful
Death Statute Violates Indiana’s Equal Privileges Clause
The Equal Privileges Clause of the Indiana Constitution provides
that “[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of
citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens.”208
This provision of Indiana’s
Constitution has been interpreted to impose two requirements on
statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes

See supra note 41 (explaining Indiana’s feticide statute).
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 701. The appellate court reasoned that the legislature intended
courts to apply the logical application of the language within statutes and doubted that the
legislature intended the results created by the Supreme Court. Id. Specifically, the court
stated,
Under Bolin’s interpretation of the statute, a person whose wrongful
act results in the death of a viable fetus owes no civil duty to the
parents and is not a tortfeasor, even if the same person is convicted of
feticide based on the same facts. The outcome is not only incongruous,
but it is also an anomaly in Indiana law.
Id.
205
Id. See O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983) (determining that since
criminal law recognized that a fetus was a person for purposes of its murder statute, it
would be illogical to deny a legal identity to a fetus in tort law).
206
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 701.
207
See Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 696 (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
405 (1970)), in which the court noted the differences in criminal and civil laws that the Bolin
decision had created by quoting the Supreme Court: “[A] judicious consideration [sic] of
precedent cannot be as threatening to public faith in the judiciary as continued adherence
to a rule unjustified in reason, which produces different results for breaches of duty in
situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.”
208
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
203
204
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of people.209 Though courts typically should refrain from scrutinizing
legislative classifications, they are justified to do so if the classification
seems arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.210 When the Indiana
Supreme Court decided Bolin in 2002, it interpreted Indiana’s Wrongful
Death or Injury to a Child Statute in a manner that unjustifiably excludes
parents of unborn children in violation of its Equal Privileges Clause.211
When the Indiana Supreme Court decided Bolin, it interpreted the
meaning of “child” in the Indiana Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child
Statute.212
When the court in Bolin concluded that the statute
encompassed only living children, the court drew a line, and in doing so,
it placed parents of children born alive on one side and parents of
children not born alive on the other side.213 This distinction creates a
difference in which there is no legitimate purpose for such disparate
treatment; instead, the privilege of maintaining a wrongful death cause
of action should apply to both parents of children born alive and parents
of viable, unborn children.214
To begin, when applying the first part of the Collins test to the
Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Indiana’s child wrongful
death statute, it becomes clear that there are no inherent differences
See supra note 148 (listing the requirements needed to pass Indiana constitutional
scrutiny).
210
Id. See Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 865 (N.D. 1984). In overturning its state’s
use of the born-alive rule for fetal wrongful death, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
noted the manifest flaws of that position. Id. The court stated that “[w]e believe that it is
commonly understood that an unborn child is a human being or person which has life and
which, even prior to the process of birth, can experience death.” Id. Therefore, the court
refused to uphold a position which produced unreasonable and indefensible results taken
with contemporary understandings. Id.
211
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 701–03. The court found that there were no inherent differences
between the parents of a child born alive and the parents of a viable fetus. Id. at 701.
Specifically, the appellate court rejected that the harm suffered, evidentiary standards, or
the simple fact that a child is born were sufficient to justify the unequal treatment of
parents of unborn children. Id. at 702–03. See, e.g., O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 908
(Mo. 1983) (holding that parents of children born alive and parents of viable fetuses suffer
the same emotional harm when the child is negligently killed).
212
See supra text accompanying notes 139–40 (explaining the 1984 amendments which
provided the current definition of the term “child” in the wrongful death statute); see also
Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. 2002).
213
See supra text accompanying note 145 (stating how Bolin has precluded the parents of a
viable child negligently killed from recovery in wrongful death); see also Bolin, 764 N.E.2d
at 203 (stating that a viable fetus is not included in the class of individuals protected by the
wrongful death statute); Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 694 (stating that Indiana’s current law does
not protect viable fetuses in wrongful death cases). But see McVey v. Sargent, 855 N.E.2d
324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
214
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703; see also O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908 (stating that parents whose
child is killed before birth and parents whose child is killed shortly after birth both suffer
nearly identical emotional harm).
209
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between parents of a child born alive and parents of a viable, unborn
fetus.215 It is important to distinguish that recovery for wrongful death
focuses on the survivors, in this case the parents, and not the children
that are born alive or die before this point.216 Although the court did not
address this specific issue in Bolin, the equal privileges and immunities
argument has been presented in the lower courts.217 Justifications for
distinguishing parents of children born alive from parents of viable
children who do not survive until birth are numerous.218 Some
commentators argue that the two classes of parents differ because of the
different evidentiary standards that apply to proving that a child is
viable or that a child is born alive.219 Others argue that parents of a child
who is born alive have a more concrete emotional attachment to the child
than parents who never actually saw their child.220 Incorrectly, the
McVey court applied the test to the children rather than the parents and
concluded that the inherent difference, sufficient to satisfy constitutional
scrutiny, was that children born alive have an independent existence

Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 702. See supra text accompanying note 108 (stating that the pain
suffered by parents whose child dies before birth and the pain suffered by parents whose
child dies after birth is the same).
216
See supra text accompanying note 53 (stating that wrongful death actions are meant to
compensate survivors or living people, not the decedent). See Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 204
(noting that courts have come to different conclusions about whether the inherent
differences referred to in the Collins test refers to the parents of the child wrongfully killed
or the child itself); Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 702 (discussing why the parents should be the focus
of the argument). But c.f. McVey, 855 N.E.2d at 328 (discussing why the child should be the
focus of the constitutional scrutiny).
217
See supra notes 148, 152–53 and accompanying text (examining two different
perspectives on the current interpretation of the child wrongful death statute in relation to
Indiana’s Equal Privileges Clause).
218
See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (giving multiple examples of why viable
children should be protected under a wrongful death statute).
219
See Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 704 (Mathias, J. concurring). Judge Mathias argues that the
word “individual” is given a contextual meaning if a viability standard is used. Id. A fetus
will be considered an “individual” if she can be proven viable, yet a fetus a day older who
is not medically capable of surviving independently will not be considered an “individual”
for purposes of the statute. Id. Indeed, viability could depend on whether the expectant
mother is able to reach a modern metropolitan hospital where her child might survive
rather than having access only to a rural hospital without the same advanced prenatal care
facilities. Id.
220
See supra notes 116 and accompanying text (describing the Missouri Supreme Court’s
determination that the harm suffered by parents who lose a viable fetus and parents who
lose a child shortly after birth suffer the same pain); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703 (stating
that both groups of parents are emotionally injured and it should be up to a jury to
quantify this damage for purposes of the wrongful death statute rather than simply
excluding parents of unborn children because the emotional damage is difficult to
quantify).
215
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outside the mother’s body, whereas unborn fetuses do not have such an
independent existence.221
The differences used to justify the distinctions above are not inherent
differences in situations related to the subject-matter of the legislation
that necessitate different or exclusive legislation with respect to members
of the class.222 First, there are no inherent differences that necessitate
compensating parents whose child dies shortly after birth, while denying
recovery to parents whose child dies shortly before birth.223 Both groups
of parents suffer the loss of their child through the wrongful act of
another person.224 Though it is argued that the different evidentiary
standards justify the distinction between the parents, the difference in
litigation costs is not an inherent difference between the parents.225
Furthermore, under the born-alive rule, two elements must be proven:
first, that the injury sustained by the unborn child is the proximate cause
of his death; and second, that the injury that resulted in the unborn
child’s death occurred when the fetus was viable.226 Under a viability
rule, parents have to prove the same two elements with slightly more
difficulty merely because the child dies inside the mother rather than
outside the mother.227 The different means of proving these two
See McVey, 855 N.E.2d at 328. The McVey court also addressed the fact that the Bolin
decision created classifications between mothers and fathers. Id. Under the current law,
expectant mothers will be able to recover, but the unborn child’s father will have no cause
of action. Id. The Court found the mother’s privilege was reasonably related to the
inherent distinctions between the two, exemplified by the fact that the mother suffers the
miscarriage while the father does not. Id.
222
Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 702-03 n.13
(explaining that an equal protection argument should center on the parents of the
negligently killed child and that there are no differences sufficient to treat parents of viable
children and parents of children that survive until birth differently under the appropriately
applied constitutional scrutiny).
223
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 702; see supra notes 108, 116 and accompanying text (stating how
damages suffered by parents of unborn children and parents of children that die shortly
after birth are relatively the same).
224
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 702. The Horn court stated that both groups of parents have the
same interests at stake, mainly the death of their child from the tortious conduct of another
person. Id. The court continued to explain that although there are minor differences
between the two groups of parents, every distinction does not amount to a constitutional
difference. Id.
225
See supra note 81 (discussing how complex medical issues are resolved daily in courts
around the country); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703 (“Whether the viable fetus would have
been born alive is an issue subject to proof at trial and not unlike[,] or more difficult to
prove than[,] any other medical issue tried in Indiana courts on a daily basis.”).
226
See supra text accompanying note 81 (noting that even under a born alive test, a child
must sustain the injury that causes its death after the point of viability).
227
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (addressing the different evidentiary
standards used to determine liability under a viability approach and a born-alive
approach).
221
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elements are simply “subject to proof at trial and not unlike or more
difficult to prove than any other medical issue tried in Indiana courts on
a daily basis.”228
It is also an unreasonable subjective judgment to determine that
parents of a child who is born alive have a more concrete emotional
attachment to their child than parents of a child that dies before birth.229
The difficulty with all wrongful death statutes which allow recovery for
emotional loss is proving actual damages for lost love and affection.230
Though it might be a valid consideration for a jury in awarding damages
that parents of a child born alive get to touch and see their child, this
does not negate the fact that parents who lose their child one day before
birth can be just as emotionally damaged by the loss of their progeny
whose love and affection they would have enjoyed, but for the
intervening wrongful act.231
Finally, there is no inherent difference between a viable child and
one that is born alive.232 The McVey court found the inherent difference
which justified the unequal treatment between unborn children and
children that have been born is that “the child who has been born has an
independent existence outside the mother’s body[.]”233 The definition of
viability is a fetus reaching such a stage in development to exist
independently of the mother.234 Therefore, the only difference between
228
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703. The court highlights that the same medical evidence used to
prove a viability rule under wrongful death statutes is used to prove that a defendant has
murdered a fetus under section 35-42-1-1(4) (2004) of the Indiana Code. Id. This proof may
be shown through a fetal autopsy which will most likely be performed whether the child
dies before or after birth. Id.
229
See supra notes 108, 116 and accompanying text (explaining that both parents of viable
fetuses and parents of children who die shortly after birth suffer the same emotional
trauma).
230
See supra notes 60–62 (explaining which emotional harms are legally recoverable
damages); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703.
231
Horn, 824 N.E.2d at 703. Although assessing emotional damages such as loss of love
and affection is highly difficult in cases dealing with unborn or young children, the
argument that parents of a child born alive have a more direct emotional attachment to the
child, and therefore a more quantifiable loss, does not carry much weight. Id. Both
mothers must carry their child during gestation which creates an emotional bond whether
the child is born alive or not. Id. Further, it is not uncommon for parents of a stillborn
fetus to hold their child after birth. Id.
232
Id. at 702. The only difference between the two groups of children is that one survives
until birth while the other dies shortly before birth. Id. This amounts to nothing more than
parents of viable fetuses expending more resources and effort in litigating their wrongful
death claim than parents of a child that dies after birth. Id. at 703.
233
See supra note 153 and accompanying text (giving examples of how fetuses and live
children are different). See also McVey v. Sargent, 855 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
234
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1597 (defining viable as “[c]apable of
living, esp[ecially] outside the womb”).
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the two children—birth—will not suffice to create a proper distinction
under Indiana’s constitutional scrutiny.235
Because the first part of the Collins test fails, specifically that there
are no inherent characteristics that distinguish the unequally treated
classes, there is no need to address the second part of the test.236 The
privilege given to parents whose child is born of maintaining a wrongful
death suit for injuries inflicted on a child in utero is not reasonably
related to inherent distinctions between them and parents of viable,
unborn child.237 Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Bolin
creates situations where the child wrongful death statute will violate
Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution as applied.238
C. Indiana Should Allow Parents of Viable, Unborn Children to Maintain
Wrongful Death Claims as a Matter of Public Policy
The Indiana Supreme Court effectively turned back the clock when it
traded in the state’s viability approach for the outdated born-alive
rule.239 Advances in obstetrics and neonatology have compelled every
state to abandon the common law notion that the mother and her unborn
child were one entity, and this same reasoning has compelled a majority
of the states to abandon the born-alive rule.240 Indeed, the Bolin holding
235
Horn, 855 N.E.2d at 703. In concluding, the court found that parents of viable fetuses
and parents of children that die shortly after birth have no differences that permit different
constitutional treatment. Id. The court went further in finding that the current
interpretation of the wrongful death statute completely prohibits fathers of unborn
children from any remedy at law when that child is tortiously killed. Id. The court could
not contemplate any legitimate reason for treating fathers differently than mothers,
therefore finding that the current interpretation of Indiana’s Wrongful Death or Injury of a
Child statute violates the Indiana Constitution in multiple ways. Id.
236
Id. at 702 (since the court found that the treatment of the two groups of parents was
not reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated
groups, the court did not address whether the unequal treatment was uniformly applicable
and available to all people similarly situated).
237
Id.
238
Id. See also Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 24 n.20 (Ind. App. 1971). Earlier court
decisions have questioned whether distinctions between viable fetuses and children who
die shortly after birth could meet federal constitutional scrutiny. Id. “Superficially, at least,
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions under the Equal Protection Clause with
respect to illegitimate children cast some doubt on the constitutionality of excluding
unborn and stillborn children.” Id. (citations omitted).
239
See supra text accompanying note 154 (explaining the effect of the Indiana Supreme
Court’s holding in Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 2002)); see also Horn, 824 N.E.2d at
701 (noting that the court determined that the Indiana Supreme Court turned the clock
back a century when it overturned Britt and returned to following the common law born
alive rule).
240
See supra note 74 (noting that only fourteen states still require that a child be born alive
to recover for injuries sustained before birth).
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should be overturned because it does not follow contemporary and
equitable understandings of wrongful death recovery.
To begin, the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Bolin is
inconsistent with modern understandings and trends in wrongful death
recovery.241 Thirty states recognize a cause of action when a viable child
is wrongfully killed along with the five states that allow recovery for
pre-viable children that are wrongfully killed.242 The Indiana Supreme
Court justified its position by claiming the legislature was simply
creating a clear line—birth—which would enable parents to recover for
the wrongful death of their child.243 The court reasoned that the
legislature was attempting to avoid the confusion and difficulty that
results from attempting to prove a child was viable at the time of its
death.244 The fact that the legislature set the point at birth is rationally
related to its interest in having a clear time defined for its citizens so that
they might then pursue the action authorized by the statute.245
However, although Indiana may have an interest in giving a clear
definition to its citizens when they might pursue a wrongful death claim,
drawing the line at birth is inequitable and unjust for many reasons. As
the majority of the states in the country have identified, if a child can
recover for prenatal injuries if it survives until live birth, there is no
adequate reason to cut off the right to be free from tortious injury simply
because the injury is severe enough to cause death.246 Lines of
demarcation, such as birth, should be disregarded if they create
unjustifiable and incongruous results.247 Most states have recognized the
fact that the loss suffered by parents is substantially the same whether
the child dies immediately before birth or immediately after birth.248 By
241
See supra notes 88, 100 and accompanying text (identifying the large majority of states
which follow either the viability or pre-viability approaches to fetal wrongful death).
242
See supra notes 88, 100 and accompanying text (identifying the large majority of states
which follow either the viability or pre-viability approaches to fetal wrongful death).
243
See supra note 153 (justifying the exclusion of parents whose child does not survive
until birth from wrongful death recovery).
244
See supra text accompanying note 98 (stating how the viability approach carries more
difficult evidentiary standards than the born alive rule).
245
See supra note 153 (justifying the exclusion of parents whose child does not survive
until birth from wrongful death recovery); see also McVey v. Sargent, 855 N.E.2d 324, 329
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
246
See Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 397 (D.C. 1984) (stating that
liability should not be extinguished by the event of death); see also supra notes 54–55 and
accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the common law idea that it was cheaper to
kill the victim than to injure him).
247
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill. 1973), superseded by statute 2008
WL 4210537 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. Sep 12, 2008) (NO. 1-05-3202).
248
See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing that the harm suffered by
parents is the same no matter when their child perishes).
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denying recovery for viable children killed before birth, Indiana is
perpetuating the criticism of the common law rule that it is cheaper to
kill the victim than to scratch it.249
Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, Indiana should adopt a new
statute clearly reflecting the legislature’s intent to offer relief to
prospective parents.250 In order to fairly and uniformly offer relief to
expectant parents, Indiana should follow the viability approach that the
state followed for over thirty years prior to 2002.251
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In Bolin, the Indiana Supreme Court effectively precluded expectant
parents from maintaining a cause of action for the wrongful death of
their unborn child unless that child suffers a prenatal injury and survives
until birth; fortunately, this inequitable result can be avoided.252 With its
holding in Bolin, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed thirty years of
established case law providing parents a remedy for the pain and
suffering associated with the death of their soon-to-be-child.253 In order
to clearly convey that the Indiana Supreme Court incorrectly identified
the legislature’s intent when reestablishing the common law born-alive
rule, the Indiana legislature should amend the current wrongful death
statute to unequivocally advance a viability approach that would offer a
remedy to parents of viable, unborn children.254 Part IV.A explains why
the current interpretation of Indiana’s child wrongful death statute is
flawed and unacceptable in modern society.255 Part IV.B then proposes
an amendment that would clearly indicate that Indiana includes parents
of viable, unborn children in the class of individuals capable of
maintaining a claim under the child wrongful death statute.256 Finally,
249
See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the common
law idea that it was cheaper to kill the victim than injure him).
250
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to Indiana’s Wrongful Death or Injury of a
Child Statute).
251
See supra text accompanying notes 136–37 (noting that Indiana followed the viability
rule from 1972 to 2002).
252
See supra Part II.D (explaining the court’s holding in Bolin which found the Indiana
legislature intended to exclude parents of viable unborn children from recovery, even
though the state had allowed recovery for the previous thirty years).
253
See supra Part II.D (discussing Indiana’s fetal wrongful death statute and its
application).
254
See supra Part III (challenging the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child Statute as violating the Indiana Constitution and not
expressing the legislature’s intent).
255
See infra Part IV.A (identifying the problems created by the current interpretation of
the child wrongful death statute).
256
See infra Part IV.B (proposing a model amendment).
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Part IV.C highlights the advantages this rule will have on Indiana as a
whole.257
A. The Born-Alive Rule Is Incompatible With Indiana Law and Produces
Unjust Results
Currently, Indiana law protects the unborn in criminal law and
portions of civil law, yet not in civil wrongful death actions.258 It makes
little sense that Indiana lawmakers intended to punish an individual
criminally for his reckless acts which resulted in the death of a viable
unborn child while simultaneously determining that the same individual
owes no civil duty to the child’s parents for the same act.259
Furthermore, Indiana offers civil remedies for unborn children in areas
such as property law.260 It is therefore difficult to reconcile that
individuals are held accountable for harming the well-being of a viable
fetus in Indiana’s homicide, property, and various others areas of law
while the parents of a viable fetus are not offered a cause of action under
the current wrongful death statute.261
Additionally, a large majority of states have found it necessary that a
remedy be available to parents whose viable, unborn child is killed by
another individual.262 Regardless of the state’s moral and ethical beliefs
about the identity of the unborn, expectant parents who lose their child
before birth suffer an injury and should have a remedy at law.263 The
Indiana Supreme Court unjustifiably has upheld the lack of a remedy for
parents of unborn children as promoting judicial efficiency and
providing lower courts with clear guidelines regarding fetal wrongful
death.264 For these reasons, Indiana’s wrongful death law needs to be

See infra Part IV.C (identifying the advantages that adopting the proposed amendment
would have on the state).
258
See supra notes 41, 144, 204 and accompanying text (giving examples of criminal
liability stemming from the killing of a viable fetus).
259
See supra note 204 (noting that Indiana prosecutes individuals for murder if they
intentionally or recklessly kill an unborn, viable child).
260
See Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 25 (Ind. App. 1971) (noting that Indiana protects the
property interests of unborn children).
261
See supra note 204 (criticizing the fact that the death of a fetus can result in criminal
liability but not civil liability).
262
See supra notes 74, 100 (listing the thirty states which allow wrongful death recovery
for viable, unborn children and the six states which offer recovery for children negligently
killed at any point past conception).
263
See supra notes 95–96 (giving justifications for allowing parents of a viable fetus to
maintain a cause of action in wrongful death).
264
See supra note 153 (declaring that the state legislature wants to provide concrete
definitions to establish who can utilize a statute and who cannot).
257
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amended to provide full recovery to parents whose unborn child is
negligently killed.265
B. Indiana’s Child Wrongful Death Statute Should Be Amended to Include
Parents of Viable Fetuses
A simple addition to Indiana’s Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child
Statute will solidify the legislature’s intent to include parents of viable,
unborn children under that statute’s provisions. The Indiana General
Assembly should amend Indiana Code section 34-23-2-1 as follows:
Sec. 1. (a) As used in this section, “child” means an
unmarried individual without dependents who is:
(1) less than twenty (20) years of age; or
(2) less than twenty-three (23) years of age and is
enrolled in a postsecondary educational institution or a
career and technical education school or program that is
not a postsecondary educational program; or
(3) a fetus that has attained viability (as defined in IND.
CODE § 16-18-2-365) . . . .266
This simple addition to the child wrongful death statute will clarify
many of the ambiguities and weaknesses of the current version of the
statute.267 First, the Indiana Supreme Court in Bolin found that the
legislature was not clear in whether they were creating an upper limit to
recovery, or as the court interpreted the statute, both an upper and lower
limit to recovery.268 With the addition of this Note’s proposed
amendment, it will become clear that the language used to describe the
term “child” in subsections (1) and (2) of the statute was included to
place an upper limit on recovery.269 The upper limit to recovery is
necessary to limit a parent’s ability to collect damages under wrongful
death for an older child whose emotional connection to the child is
tenuous and further to differentiate between the child and adult
See supra note 18 (providing the text of the Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child
statute).
266
IND. CODE § 16-18-2-365 (2007) (defining viability as “the ability of a fetus to live
outside the mother’s womb[]”). The italicized text is the contribution of the author.
267
See supra note 18 (Indiana already compensates for non-pecuniary losses under its
wrongful death statute, specifically for the loss of the child’s services and the child’s love
and compassion).
268
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
269
See supra Part III.A (advocating that the legislature’s intent in adding the factors to
describe the term “child” in the wrongful death statute were originally meant to create an
upper limit to recovery).
265
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wrongful death statutes.270 The amendment, subsection (3) of the statute,
will identify the lower limit for which parents could seek recovery—
viability—which provides clear guidelines to the court and parents that
recovery is only possible at this point. Viability is a logical placement of
a lower limit for wrongful death purposes because it precludes parents
from seeking recovery during the early stages of pregnancy when the
child’s birth is less certain than after the point of viability.271
Furthermore, it limits recovery for emotional damages to parents who
have a reasonable expectation that their child will be born in the later
stages of pregnancy and who possibly develop a stronger emotional
connection with their future offspring.272
Finally, the addition of the amendment to Indiana’s Wrongful Death
or Injury of a Child Statute will actually provide courts with a clearer
definition of the class of individuals covered by the statute.273 The Bolin
court worried that without setting a specific point at which parents may
recover for the death of a child caused by another’s negligence would
result in “open–ended liability.”274 The above proposed amendment will
provide Indiana Courts and its citizenry with clear notice of when a
cause of action is permitted.275 Though determining viability is more
difficult than determining if a child is born alive, Indiana courts
determine whether a fetus is viable in abortion and homicide laws,
making it a routine matter regularly resolved by the state’s courts.276
C. As Amended, Indiana’s Wrongful Death Statute Will Offer Acceptable
Relief and Work in Conjunction With Indiana’s Other Laws
If the proposed changes are made to Indiana’s Wrongful Death or
Injury of a Child Statute, Indiana’s wrongful death law will finally be

See supra text accompanying note 114 (discussing the criticism of the pre-viability rule,
that is, that it awards damages that are too speculative given the circumstances).
271
See supra text accompanying note 114 (discussing the criticism of the pre-viability
rule—that it awards damages that are too speculative given the circumstances).
272
See supra note 112 (explaining that one of the main weaknesses of the pre-viability rule
is that whether a pregnancy will culminate in a live birth during the early stages of
pregnancy is speculative).
273
See supra notes 18, 153 (providing justifications and explanations of where to draw the
line for recovery in fetal wrongful death cases).
274
McVey v. Sargent, 855 N.E.2d 324, 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
275
See supra note 153 (explaining the Indiana Supreme Court’s desire to have a clear point
defined for its citizens regarding when a cause of action would be permitted in fetal
wrongful death).
276
See supra note 228 (stating that Indiana’s feticide law requires the same evidence to
prove liability as a viability rule requires to prove liability for wrongful death).
270
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compatible with other aspects of Indiana law.277 Just as Indiana’s
abortion, homicide, and property laws all recognize a viable unborn
fetus, Indiana’s wrongful death law will do the same and offer the same
results.278 No longer will the state of Indiana hold an individual
criminally responsible for actions that resulted in the death of a fetus and
at the same time find that the guilty party owes no civil duty to the
parents who continue to suffer from their loss.279
Furthermore, if Indiana adopts the proposed legislation, it will once
again join the thirty–six states that hold that parents whose unborn,
viable child is negligently killed will have a remedy at law for their
suffering.280 Instead of Indiana being criticized for drawing an arbitrary
line precluding parents from recovery if their child dies before birth, the
state will identify a clear class of individuals who will have a cause of
action, and more fully address the harm suffered by expectant parents if
the amendment is adopted.
V. CONCLUSION
If Indiana adopts the amendment proposed in Part IV, the state will
once again be in line with the majority of states in recognizing and
compensating for the injury expectant parents suffer when their unborn
child is taken from them due to the negligent and reckless acts of other
individuals. This Note does not call for any moral, philosophical, or
theological determinations of what constitutes life; rather, it simply
proposes that parents of an unborn child suffer a great emotional harm
when that child is tortiously killed and should not be denied recovery. If
the amendment is adopted, Indiana law will justly compensate this great
harm—as the state had done for thirty years prior to 2002.
Under the current law, John, the reckless and inebriated driver from
Part I, will not owe any duty to Ashley and David for killing their first
child, even though the state will hold him criminally liable. However, if
Indiana adopts the amendment proposed in this Note, John will be held
accountable to those most injured—the parents of the child he killed
through his reckless acts. As this hypothetical demonstrates, Indiana

See supra Part III.A (discussing how the current application of the child wrongful
death statute is not in accord with the state’s other laws).
278
See supra notes 41, 144, 204 and accompanying text (providing examples of other
Indiana laws which protect a viable fetus).
279
See supra note 204 and accompanying text (giving an example of when an individual
could be criminally charged but escape civil liability).
280
See supra note 88 (listing the thirty states which follow the viability approach for fetal
wrongful death).
277
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should adopt the amendments proposed in this Note, so as not to leave
expectant parents with an injury for which there is no civil remedy.
Justin Curtis∗
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